University of Tennessee, Knoxville

TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative
Exchange
Doctoral Dissertations

Graduate School

8-2015

Social Systems and Psychic Confluence: Flash Mobs,
Communications, and Agency
Nicholas John Hauman
University of Tennessee - Knoxville, nhauman@vols.utk.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss
Part of the Communication Technology and New Media Commons, Mass Communication Commons,
Other Communication Commons, Other Philosophy Commons, Other Sociology Commons, Political
Economy Commons, Politics and Social Change Commons, Social Media Commons, and the Theory,
Knowledge and Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Hauman, Nicholas John, "Social Systems and Psychic Confluence: Flash Mobs, Communications, and
Agency. " PhD diss., University of Tennessee, 2015.
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/3424

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at TRACE: Tennessee
Research and Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact
trace@utk.edu.

To the Graduate Council:
I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Nicholas John Hauman entitled "Social
Systems and Psychic Confluence: Flash Mobs, Communications, and Agency." I have examined
the final electronic copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be
accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a
major in Sociology.
Harry F. Dahms, Major Professor
We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance:
Michelle Brown, Amy J. Elias, Paul K. Gellert
Accepted for the Council:
Carolyn R. Hodges
Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School
(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)

Social Systems and Psychic Confluence: Flash Mobs,
Communications, and Agency

A Dissertation Presented for the
Doctor of Philosophy
Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Nicholas John Hauman
August 2015

Copyright © 2015 by Nicholas J. Hauman
All rights reserved.

ii

ABSTRACT
This dissertation involves two components: 1) an analysis of the history of flash mobs
including detailed descriptions of specific flash mobs and 2) an exploration of what this
analysis elucidates concerning the interaction between individuals and social structure.
By focusing on the flash mob as a form of communication, the dissertation displays how
the flash mob has communicated multiplicitously through various social systems (e.g. art,
mass media, economy, politics) to achieve various and often divergent ends. Within this
larger understanding of the interaction between flash mobs and social structure this
dissertation also finds, through an application of Luhmannian systems theory, that
individuals communicate through flash mobs in ways more similar than different from
social systems. Most significantly, both individuals and social structures interpenetrate
with other systems to communicate via flash mob. Luhmann views social systems as
quasi-independent systems that, while determined by their own internal structure, borrow
on each other to achieve continued existence−an act he calls interpenetration. I argue that
within this interpenetration, individuals, by acting in a like manner to social systems,
experience psychic confluence−a phenomenon in which both individuals and social
systems simultaneously influence and alter one another. In this space, despite systems
quasi-autonomy, human agency (an individual’s ability to affect social structure) and
structure (social structure’s ability to affect individuals) are opened to each other in the
self-same moment. Through the analysis of flash mobs, this dissertation illustrates how it
may be more instructive not to understand structure and agency as separate, diametrically
opposed causal influences, but as co-existing potentialities defined by the same process.
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INTRODUCTION
Sociology has an unacknowledged crisis concerning agency that grows out of an ironic
contradiction despite agency becoming a central theoretical concern for sociology−
starting with Giddens (1976; 1986). His publication of The Constitution of Society
marked the initial identification of the tension between structure and agency latent within
social theory as well as a potential solution to the problem. Most notably, he identified
the interaction between the individual and social structure occurring in a process over
time through which both individuals and social structure co-construct one another and
provide the necessary conditions for their continued existences. Despite having
acknowledged, popularized, and offered the most accepted solution to the theoretical
problem of the relationship between individuals and social structure, the theorization of
structure and agency by Giddens, as well as the related solutions offered by Archer
(1988; 2001; 2003) and Bhaskar (1979; 1986), have failed to recognize that, as modernity
deepens, social structure changes in ways which negates the current theorized agency’s
potential. Whether we are discussing the introduction of the internet into the mass media,
the expansion of the government via growing military and police subcontracting
networks, or the enabling of lightning-speed economic exchanges through technology,
the social structures surrounding us are buzzing with an activity that appears to
increasingly concretize social existence. Current theories of agency, exemplified in the
works of Giddens (1976; 1986) as well as related work by Bhaskar (1979; 1986), and
Archer (1988; 2001; 2003), perceive the potential of human agency to be “external” to
social structure and individuals as being diametrically opposed causal forces. This
implies that it is the attributes of individuals remaining “outside” of the social system,
1

purged of its influence, that represents the genuine agency of the individual. So, if we
juxtapose the current understanding of agency against social structure’s expansion, the
necessary outcome is agency becoming increasingly impossible as the world solidifies
and encases us. If this is in fact the case, then the assertion of human agency is little more
than a smoke screen, covering up agency’s disappearance. The vehement assertion of
agency within critical realism and structuration theory is then denial in the face of human
agency’s death.
This dissertation’s goal is not to prove that this is the case. It neither seeks to
display agency as dying nor human influence over social structure as null and void.
Rather it intends to take the first steps towards reconsidering human agency. If our
understanding of what we mean by influencing social structure is reversed, than we can
comprehend human agency as something occurring within the influence of social
structure. More precisely, agency ironically occurs at the moment when individuals are
influenced by social structure rather than outside of its influence; the moment of
structural influence is, likewise, the moment when individuals have the potential to
influence social structure, because structure opens itself to the influence of the human
agent.
The importance of this subtle shift cannot be overstated. If correct, then an
analysis of human agency may allow us to better understand the mutual influence
individuals and social structure have on each other. The steps to our dance with social
structure may become explicit. However, it is important to stress this would not mean we
can finally control social structure, utilizing social structure like a car and steering it to
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our own will: the influence is always only influence.1 Nonetheless, by becoming more
cognizant of our influence (something of which social structures are incapable),
redefinition of our influence over social system may possibly allow us to utilize our
influence over social system to recode the social system. Perhaps we can alter the social
structure in ways that, rather than representing the inertia of social structure, represent the
will and desire of human agents.2
I am not presenting this potential as a re-introduction of the distinction between
social structure and the individual presented by existing theories of agency. This
understanding does not necessitate individuals acting contra to social structure. Often the
collective or individual desires of agents are in concert with the social system. Yet,
recognizing our complex relations to the social structures surrounding us may allow for a
fluidity of influence over the social system and allow for alternative potentialities.
Conversely, if the notion that agency occurs in concert with social structure is
incorrect, and agency occurs by exerting causal influence outside of the reach of social
structure, than asserting human agency is still pointless. What little agency can be
displayed by theorists as occurring outside of the influence or downright control of the

1

This was a metaphor famously employed by Luhmann (1997) to describe the inability of systems, be they

individuals or parts of social structure, to control either social structures other than themselves, in an article
entitle “The Limits of Steering.”
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As will be displayed later in the dissertation, for Luhmann, social structure is not sentient, it does not have

consciousness. This is a central attribute of individuals defining their difference from the social structures
with which they interact.
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social system is rapidly and clearly dissipating. As social structure grows, as structural
communications are ramped up, and as more of our communications are concretized by
social structure, the space of human agency is a dying phenomenon. If agency only exists
outside the system, then the increasing focus on proving the existence of agency, and on
asserting that human agency is a “necessary” human capacity, only acts to cover up that
this agency is becoming impossible.
It is my desire here to present the expansion of system as an empirical fact. The
death of agency is not. It is only if agency is seen as external to structure that the
expansion of system would, in turn, mean the destruction of agency. Instead, if agency is
seen as occurring within system, then the expansion of system would not necessitate the
destruction of human agency. In fact, an argument could even be made that, because of
the expansion of the sites of contact between the individual and social structure, that the
expansion of social structure may even increase human agency as Structure’s influence
on individuals grows. Through the occurrence of more interactions, individuals have
more potential to influence structure, despite the fact that structure would, conversely,
possess an increased potential for influencing individuals.
Why Systems Theory?
This dissertation’s basis for understanding agency as occurring within the mutual
influence individuals and social structure is Luhmann’s (1996; 2012; 2013) systems
theory. Luhmann, utilizing descriptions of biological, ecological, cybernetic, and
mechanical systems in the hard sciences, describes how social systems literally gain a life
of their own and become capable of guaranteeing their own continued existence by
4

reconstruct themselves on the basis of their own internal processes. For my purposes his
theory overcomes the theoretical difficulties existing in other theories of agency because:
1) human beings are not perceived as atoms or parts of social systems but as systems
themselves, 2) the concept of interpenetration, the mutual influence between systems,
opens up the potential for the form of mutual influence previously described, and 3)
despite fully recognizing the massive expansion of social system Luhmann, nonetheless,
constructs a space in where human beings can influence system.
For the most part, existing theories of agency (Giddens, Bhaskar, Archer) posit
human beings as the building blocks of social structure. Social structure is a
conglomeration of human individuals. For Luhmann, social structure is not composed out
of individuals but communications. This means that for Luhmann individuals are external
to social structure. In fact, as will be discussed in some detail, social structure and
individuals share a similar structure that Luhmann calls a system, autopoietic system, or
functionally differentiated system. This structure, as part of its basic attribute, creates a
divide between itself and the outside world, thus freeing it from its environment and
gaining the ability to self-regulate, to have its own internal structure maintain itself.
Because human beings and social structure are both autopoietic, there is, automatically, a
divide between them.3 For the relationship between individuals and social structures, this
differentiation means that, rather than being contradictory forces, the individual and
social structure are co-existing phenomena with mutual independence. But, this
independence, rather than being a platform for human agency, as critical realism and
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For more on social systems see Chapter Three
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structuration theory assumes, actually acts as a barrier to agency. Being external to social
structure likewise means being separated from social structure. To influence social
structure, individuals must cross the divide of their functional differentiation from social
structure.
This leads us to Luhmann’s second contribution to the theory of agency being
constructed in this dissertation: the concept of interpenetration. For Luhmann
interpenetration is the form of influence through which social systems interrelate with
one another despite being independent. Interpenetration is not an act of control but of
influence. Systems borrow on one another’s complexity. One system utilizes other
systems to continue its own existence. Individuals, when viewed as systemically
structured, possess the same capacity to interpenetrate with social systems, to utilize
social systems and to be utilized by them in turn.4
Finally, unlike other theories, Luhmann’s (1998) theory is capable of
acknowledging simultaneously the growth of social system and the possibility of human
agency. Luhmann acknowledges the expansion of social structure; that “communication
has increased in volume, complexity, memory, and pace” (p. 85). This occurs as a result
of growth of social systems, a process which Luhmann (2013) claims is central to
modernity. He “defines modernity in terms of its differentiation” (p. 87). Discussed in
chapter three, social structure’s differentiation likewise means that it becomes dependent
on its ability to guarantee future communications for its continued existence. This process
increases modernity’s complexity and social structure.

4

The process of interpenetration is described in more detail in chapter three.
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Luhmann (1998; 2012; 2013) not only explicates this process in works outlining
his greater theoretical model, Social System and Theory of Society, but the expanding
complexity of society is a central theme in nearly all his works theorizing individual
social systems, including his work on economics (1988), politics (1990), science (1990),
the mass media (2000), art (2000), and law (2004). In each of these works Luhmann
provides descriptions of the process by which the specific system became autopoietic.
For instance, in The Reality of the Mass Media, Luhmann (2000) displays how the
construction of a permanent daily news media (or hourly news media for that matter) or
the design of television plots ensures continued viewership and is tied to the process of
the mass media becoming autopoietic, which constructed media’s need for guaranteeing
future communications or, likewise, for the economy, that the circulation of capital is
connected to its self-perpetuation (Luhmann, 1988). This perpetual loop: communication
being structured to guarantee more communication means that as more systems become
autopoietic, more communications become assumed and can therefore occur more easily
and frequently. The growth of social structure is, therefore, inherent to a process which
Luhmann sees nearly everywhere within modern society.
But identifying this fact does not lead to a rejection of agency. Luhmann’s
understanding of individual’s interactions with social structure could be described as one
in which people have agency, despite the growth of social systems that increasingly
dominate human society and structure the communications occurring within society. This
means that Luhmann, simultaneously, identifies the growth of the social system and the
ability of individuals to influence social structure.

7

In is in these three ways, systems theory aids the construction of a theory of
agency capable of overcoming issues with existing theories of agency. In particular, it
allows us to reverse the relationship between structural influences and agency. By
positing individuals not as within structure but as already outside of structure, agents’
influence on structure can be seen as occurring by crossing the divide between
themselves and social system. In addition to this, systems theory identifies the growth of
social structure, which it sees as a process of social structure’s differentiation and
therefore becoming social systems, and thus independent systems which focus on their
own self-perpetuation.
Limitations of Existing Systems Theory
Despite the advantages of Luhmann’s theory as it currently exists, it is insufficient as a
theory of agency. The motive of this dissertation is to amend and clarify systems theory.
Currently the theory of agency within systems theory appears only latently, not
manifestly. In chapter three, I will show how this latent theory of agency can be seen
within Luhmann’s work despite not being overtly present. Some interpretations of
Luhmann have further obfuscated Luhmann’s latent theory of agency by misidentifying
Luhmann’s work as a form of anti-humanism. Therefore, to utilize the positive attributes
of systems theory in regard to constructing a theory of agency, the dissertation must both
make manifest Luhmann’s position on human agency as well as challenge anti-humanist
interpretations of Luhmann.
The second limitation is the lack of an empirical referent in systems theory. As
acknowledged by Nassehi (1998), systems theorists utilizing Luhmann have become
8

bogged down in abstract theorizing, only refining and clarifying Luhmann’s existing
theory, which is itself extremely abstract. As Nassehi also acknowledges, the real
measure of Luhmann’s theory will be its ability to apply itself to empirical reality.5 This

5

Here I am utilizing the term “empirical” in the philosophical sense of making reference to an external

reality. I do not mean that the study is conducted in a scientific manner or that it seeks further justification
for its empirical observations by the implementation of a specific method of observation. This approach
makes sense within systems theory because, for Luhmann, the specific method of a discipline is a result of
the internal processes of the specific scientific social system making the observation; the method represents
the codes constructed within that system rather than having its impetus from outside that system as a result
of the “objective” or “outside” world imposing limitations on the system. Therefore for Luhmann (1995;
1998; 2012; 2013), borrowing on Brown’s (1969) “Calculus of Indications,” the object of empirical study is
not the external reality but the form of observation, the method itself, that provides the true empirical
content of science. All sciences study their method, that is their own coding, each time an observation or
communication is made about an “objective” external reality. The observation is actually of its
environment, which is itself a product of the sciences’ coding. The converse side of this is that Luhmann
likewise lays claim to an external reality, as can be seen in his description of the expansion of system
above. Claims about the history of social systems and observations derived from society are present in most
of Luhmann’s (1988; 1990; 2000; 2004; 2012; 2013) major works. Thus, a discussion of external reality is
possible for Luhmann though the implementation of a rigorous scientific method does not guarantee the
correspondence of that method to empirical reality. It also does not mean that what is observed utilizing
scientific methodology does not correspond to the external reality. As Knudsen (2010) identified, despite
lacking this quality of a guarantor, for Luhmann “method can still be an important driving force in the
development of interesting empirical problematics and analyses” (p.1). Nonetheless Luhmann recognizes
such applications as accomplished through acts of reduction. Identifying its reductionism is not identifying
a flaw but opens the door for other potential forms of reduction, other methods for reducing information,
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criticism is particularly pertinent as we move towards a systems theory of agency. This is
because if such a theory is to prove itself truly useful, not only in interpreting our
interactions with social structure, but also in opening up a real potential for human action,
we have to clarify, simultaneously, the interaction between social systems, their influence
on individuals, and the individual’s influence on the system in empirical reality. In other
words, simply displaying a potential of human agency within social structure in the
abstract does not take us as far−in terms of constructing a theory of human agency
capable of identifying the potential and limitations of human agency−if it cannot observe
the moment of interpenetration, the moment of mutual influence, between individuals and
social structure as they have actual occurred in a reality external to theory itself.
Thus the following dissertation will have three major tasks: 1) to lay the
foundations for a theory where agency occurs within system’s influence; 2) to attempt to
elucidate the interaction between individuals and social structure in systems theory; and
3) to outline this interaction empirically.
Outline of Chapter
Each of the following chapters are designed to fulfill these three tasks. Chapter one
provides the necessary empirical foundation for the entire dissertation through an
extended description of flash mobs. This description will include provide details
concerning individual flash mobs, the historical context surrounding flash mobs, and the
self-descriptions of the flash mob by organizers. This narrative provides the reader with
which are to be employed with equal utility for understanding the natural, social, psychic systemic
environments surrounding us.
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an understanding of the various examples of flash mobs as well as reviews the existing
scholarly literature concerning flash mobs, both of which will be utilized throughout the
dissertation. Additionally, this chapter supplies the first step to building an empirical
description of the theory of agency, which allows us to discuss in subsequent chapters the
ramifications of utilizing existing theories of agency as oppose to the systems theory of
agency to interpret the flash mob.
Flash mobs were selected for empirical description for various reasons. First, the
flash mob is inherently modern and itself tied to proliferation of communication. Its
genesis lies in the technological networks of communication and their proliferation across
the blogosphere and YouTube. Here identifying the place of human agency also means
seeing the potential individuals have to impact the massive, ever-expanding social
structure described above. This, in turn, means that identifying the place of individual
influence in flash mobs not only illustrates that agents can affect structure, but that they
can influence modern social structure.
Second, flash mobs are expressly about communication. Whether held for
political, economic, humanitarian, or aesthetic reasons, the flash mob’s goal is to
proliferate its content to a mass audience. As has been hinted above and will be fully
examined below, communication is central to Luhmann’s theory since he understands
social structure as systems of communication. Thus, with its communicative goals, the
flash mob provides an appropriate test case.
Finally, the interaction between various social systems are easily identifiable in
flash mobs. This allows us to examine social systems in their multiplicity interacting with
one another and individuals and thus allows us to examine the interaction between
11

structure and agency in a larger societal context. I would argue, in fact, it is only possible
to understand human beings’ interaction with social systems when considering the
multiplicities that cut across individual communications, because that interaction is itself
multifaceted and exceptionally complicated (another corner stone of Luhmann’s
analysis).
In chapter two, with the empirical background provided, I turn to the issue of
structure and agency. Here I specifically define structure and agency and discuss the
theoretical models of structure and agency presented in the theories of structuration and
critical realism. Specific focus is placed on how these theoretical traditions understand
structure and agency as contradictory causal forces and, therefore, they identify agency as
something outside of structure. This investigation reveals the limitation of these theories.
When they are applied to the flash mob, and the role of the individuals in producing
them, the theory can only understand flash mobs as either representing a moment when
individuals exert themselves over social structure, when social structure exerts itself over
individuals, or some combination of the two, where each limits each other’s influence
over the flash mob. The limitation of this is twofold. As described above, these theories
of agency imply that the growth of social structure necessitates a reduction in agency, so
human agency is being pushed out of the above equation. Also they appear incongruent
with flash mobbers’ self-descriptions and force us to “determine” the degree to which
particular participants do, or do not, have agency.
Chapter three provides us with an outline of the interaction between individuals
and social structure in Luhmann’s system theory which, in turn, allows me to outline a
systems theory of structure and agency. The chapter begins by setting up the groundwork
12

for this theory of agency by 1) furnishing a general description of the major concepts of
systems theory focusing primarily on a description of Luhmann’s theory of autopoietic
systems and 2) addressing anti-humanist interpretations of Luhmann claiming that
individuals, within Luhmann’s theory, are incapable of influencing social systems. Once
this is accomplished the latent theory of agency embedded within Luhmann’s theory is
revealed. This provides us with an overall theory of human agency, what I call psychic
confluence, which is a theory of the mutual, simultaneous influence of social structure
and individuals.
The dissertation then culminates in chapter four by utilizing our empirical
discussion of flash mobs, existing theories of agency, and the systems theory of agency to
construct a systems theoretical description of flash mobs. This discussion involves two
parts. First, relying on the empirical description in chapter one, I provide a description of
various social systems (art, politics, economics, ect...) identified in Luhmann’s theory,
which can, likewise, be seen as influencing the communications of flash mobs. A
complex and rigorous, albeit still limited, description is given of the interaction and
mutual influences possessed by a plethora of social systems as they interpenetrate with
one another, each providing part of themselves and their own complexity to the
communications occurring in flash mobs. Thus, I display how different systems utilize
one another in the moment of flash mob communication.
Finally, reintroducing the influence of human individuals, themselves a system, in
a self-similar manner to the social systems, I identify how individuals influence in the
same manner as the social systems already described. Thus individuals themselves
interpenetrate with social systems−which interpenetrate with one another−utilizing social
13

structure to communicate their own consciousness. Displayed within the context of the
flash mob, this situation identifies the imperative, that if individuals are to communicate,
that is if they are going to seek to transform social systems, they must communicate in
manner structured by the system. In doing so they both transformed and open themselves
to being transformed.

14

CHAPTER 1: FLASH MOBS
Larry Niven’s (1973) novella Flash Crowd explores the explosive potential between
technology and the flow of human beings across space. In this dystopian story
teleportation booths enabling one to instantaneously travel from one location to another
have fundamentally altered human life. The movement of people has lost its regularity of
flow to become sudden and unannounced. Communities and human relationships
dissolve. Once-active social spaces are left vacant and cold. Some locations, like tropical
islands and shopping malls, become plagued by ever-increasing masses. The novella
charts a change to the social world of this dystopia, manifest from teleportation, in which
sudden influxes of people teleporting into a location after a highly televised event creates
a roving, but permanent, riot.
Thirty years later, Niven’s teleportation-driven riots served as the inspiration
behind the name “flash mob” coined by blogger Sean Savage from cheesebikini.com, an
early publicist of flash mobs (McFedries 2003; Wasik 2009). The insinuated similarity
between the “flash crowd” and “flash mob” hits at the core of the flash mob. The flash
mob is a commentary on and utilization of the cell phone, the real-life manifestation of
Niven’s teleportation booth. Fundamentally altering the flow of human communication,
the telephone constructs a hyperreal equivalent to the sudden movement of human
bodies, with similar dystopian results.
The early flash mobs, which I will refer to as aesthetic flash mobs, wished to
display these altered flows with their performances. But, just as in Flash Crowd, a
strange tension surfaces in the flash mobs’ expressions. This tension lies in the
relationship between individuals and technology, between potential and constraint,
15

between free human action and the determination by the technology, institutions, and
communications. It is in this tension, and in the deeper relationship between human
action and social structure that the tension points to, that this dissertation wishes to
interrogate. This chapter displays the history of flash mobs and explores its variations
across that history.
Flash Mob as an Aesthetic Movement
The first flash mob was held on May 27, 2003. Bob Wasik (2009), then editor of
Harper’s Magazine, was “bored” by the viral culture and decided to experiment with,
what he calls, “the buzz” (p. 6). As Wasik explains, this impulses boredom was the
byproduct of the effects of internet mediation:
I do not find myself at loose ends, sitting around doing nothing, with time
on my hands, without something to do or see to keep my interest. But such
has been true for me since the invention of the internet, with its soothingly
fast and infinitely available distractions, engaging me for hours on end
without assuaging my fundamental boredom…Interactive
technologies−video games and mobile devices as well as the web−have
kept us most boredom prone from generally thinking, as we might while
watching television, that we are “doing nothing.” (p. 18-19)
To assuage this technological boredom, Wasik sent two e-mails to sixty-three friends.
The first read:
You are invited to take part in MOB, the project that creates an
inexplicable mob of people in New York City for ten minutes or less.
16

Please forward this to other people you may know who would like to join
(p. 5).
The second, entitled “Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ),” reads:
Q. Why would you join an inexplicable mob?
A. Tons of other people are doing it (p 5).
On June 6th, in front of Claire’s Accessories store, the first flash mob, or as Wasik called
it “MOB #1,” was formed. Additional information sent through the same channel
communicated the time and location. Although the exact number of participants is
unknown, the crowd that gathered was more significant than ever anticipated, and
resulted, before the set meeting time, in police intervention closing Claire’s Accessories
and disbanding the mob (p. 19-21).

Figure 1 Sample MOB Project Instructional Slips (retrieved from www.billwasik.com 12/4/14)
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After seeing the potential of the mob, Wasik constructed an additional seven
MOBS, ending with “MOB #8” on September 10th. It was in these subsequent mobs that
the “flash mob” became a viral spectacle and constructed the basic format followed by
subsequent flash mobs. Beginning with “MOB #2,” participants met off site, were handed
instructions, synchronized their watches, suddenly appeared, performed a random act,
and (as quickly as they had formed) disbanded. One of the most infamous of Wasik’s
MOBs was MOB #3. Here Wasik had participants congregate at both the second story
mezzanine and in the first floor lobby of the Grand Hyatt Hotel. The two groups of
participants silently stared at each for several minutes and, after a short applause,
dispersed in unison (Wasik 2009; Brejzek 2010).

Figure 2 MOB #3 (retrieved www.bobwasik.com 12/4/14)
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Improv Everywhere is an improvisational troop that began conducting flash mobs
the same year as Wasik (although the troop itself predates their flash mobs) and uses the
same aesthetic with their flash mob projects, which are still active today
(improveverywhere.com). Although it is sometimes difficult to differentiate between the
general improvisations of the troop and their flash mobs, Improv Everywhere is behind
some of the most famous early flash mobs, such as “No Pants Subway Ride,” where
participants did exactly what the name implies and rode a New York subway without
pants, and “Frozen Grand Central Station,” where participants stood frozen for exactly 5
Minutes in Grand Central Station (Muse 2010).
In both Wasik’s MOB project and the Improv Everywhere mobs, there is a sense
of kynicism. Following Sloterdijk (1987) I use the term kynicism as opposed to cynicism.
Where cynicism embodies a logocentric solemnity, kynicism embodies an ironic and
sarcastic sense of play. They seek to mock the effects of technology on human interaction
and the nature of popularity in the Internet age. However, much to the disdain of most
scholarly discussions of flash mobs, they do so without a logical project for change.
Instead, they air their grievances towards technology with a sense of playfulness. This
kynical attitude of Wasik (2009) can be seen throughout his narrative concerning the
flash mob. While initially the goal of the mob was to use technology to assuage the
boredom created by the very same technology, it quickly grew into a mocking of virility
itself. Wasik sought not only to formulate large groups for the shock and rush of doing
so, but wanted to display the pointlessness of popularity, or as he prefers “the buzz,” in
the age of the internet. By gathering massive numbers of people to perform a senseless
act, he views himself as displaying that “popularity…bears no relationship to merit” in
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Figure 3 Participants Following an Order to Lay Down on the Ground in Improv Everywhere’s “MP3
Experiment Nine” (retrieved from www.improveverywhere.org 12/10/2014)

cyber culture and that the MOB project is “an experiment” that “determines just how far
one can take the former while neglecting the latter entirely; that is how much buzz one
could create about an event whose only point was buzz” (p. 23).
Pushing the joke further, with the collapse of the audience and performer, the
irony of the flash mob and its kynicism towards the viral buzz are as directed at the flash
mob itself as they are at its internet-based consumers, who are also often one and the
same persons. “The mob was all about the herd instinct,” Wasik claims, and “about the
desire not to be left out of the latest fad” (p. 28). The participants of the mob, by Wasik’s
logic, are a part of the buzz that they mock. They, likewise, are attracted by the MOB
project despite its meritlessness.
In many of the Improv Everywhere flash mobs there is a similar sense of
kynicism that utilizes, but also mocks, both technology and participants. One example of
this aesthetic is a series of nine flash mobs (as of December 2014) entitled “MP3
Experiment,” where participants simultaneously listen to a pre-recorded MP3 in a
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preselected public location. The voice, which introduces itself as “The Omnipotent
Steve” or “Mark,” gives orders to the participants in a deep distorted voice reminiscent of
a benevolent “Billy the Puppet” from the movie Saw. This en masse Simon-Says involves
diverse orders including lying on the ground, following and copying non-participants
movements, dancing, and giving away money to strangers. The performance leaves a
distinct impression, as large numbers of earbud-wearing participants sheepesquely follow
an MP3 recording. Another example can be seen in Improv Everywhere’s “Text Walking
Service” and “Seeing Eye People” flash mobs, both of which consisted of participants
clad in orange vests and leashes “posing as city workers helping people to text and walk
safely…as if the department of transportation has started this initiative”
(improveverywhere.org.)

Figure 4 Participants Following an Order to Slow Dance During Improv Everywhere’s “MP3 Experiment
Eight” (retrieved from improveverywhere.org 12/10/2014)
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Figure 5 Improv Everywhere’s “Mobile Desktop” Improvisation (retrieved from
www.improveverywhere.com 12/4/2014)

A similar critique/engagement component can be seen in Improv Everywhere’s
non-flash mob performances. During the 2011 GEL (Good Experience Live) Conference,
a customer experience conference largely directed to internet companies and
organization, Improv Everywhere staged the performance “Gotta Share,” where
participants interrupted a presentation by breaking into a song stating their need to
constantly interact with social media even when asked to turn off their electronic devices
for a presentation. Participants also mock our relationship to constantly changing
technologies in another improvisation entitled “Mobile Desktop,” where participants set
up old desktops in a Starbucks for the “free internet” (www.improveverywhere). While
the performances clearly critique technology, our dependence on it, and its constant
outmoding, it is important to note that these performances come from an organization
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imbedded in internet technologies. Many of its performances are primarily seen via the
Internet. Likewise, Improv Everywhere mocks dependency to internet technology at the
GEL conference while also being co-members of the GEL Conference with Wikipedia,
Yahoo and Quirky (www.gelconference.com).
Yet, within this kynicism is also an identification of the limitedness of a flash
mob. Wasik is aware of the way in which the flash mob is part of the very process it
seeks to mock and reinforces the system it challenges. While technology facilitates the
ability to amass people upon which Wasik’s project depends, the same technology
constructs the limits to that communication. When discussing the interaction between
boredom and the internet, Wasik explains that the empty form, or meritlessness, of the
flash mob grew out of the limitations of communicating via technology, limitations
resulting from the insistent boredom that generates the flash mob. Initially he wished to
“create a fake art scene” much to the same aesthetic end but instead constructed flash
mobs because, to reach those enthralled in the internet culture, he had to “make my idea
lazier” (p 19). Not only had the structure of internet communication limited the content
of Wasik’s MOB, but it also set its limitations in terms of its duration and impact. He said
it was “destined to run aground” (p. 36), and must follow the “peaks and backlashes” (p
34) of viral Internet communication. Wasik predicted his flash mobs would quickly grow,
but once reaching the height of their popularity, would then be quickly cast aside for a
newer, fresher phenomenon.
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Figure 6 Neon Sign Guy and MOB # 8 (retrieved from www.bobwasik.com 12/4/14)

Wasik’s identification of his own limitation of communicating via flash mob as
the progenitor of the flash mob can be seen in his descriptions of his final iteration of the
MOB Project, MOB #8. Here Wasik attempts to conclude the MOB Project. Participants
were instructed to follow pre-recorded commands by Wasik that were being “blared from
a cheap boom box” (p. 43). He desired the mob to end with a clear expression of his
kynicism of the flash mob in regard to its participant. As he explains:
I envisioned my hundreds of mobbers, following the dictates of what was
effectively a loud speaker on a pole. It was hard to get more
straightforward than that (p. 43).
But his expectations for the final mob was never fulfilled. As he explains:
But the cheering of the hundreds grew so great that it drowned out the
speakers. The mob soon became unmoored. All of a sudden in a toque,
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apparently some sort of opportunistic art shaman, opened his briefcase to
reveal a glowing neon sign, and the crowd bent to his will. He held up two
fingers, and to my horror the mob began chanting “Peace!” In retrospect, I
saw it as a fitting end for an experiment about bandwagoning and
conformity, about inattention and media hype. My crowd had ultimately
been hijacked by a figure more mysterious, more enigmatic than even the
semi-anonymous “Bill”-by a better story, that is, than me (p. 43).
Existing at “the intersection of the virtual and the physical” (p. 43), the physical bodies of
Wasik’s flash mob replicated the structure of the viral internet communication from
which it grew. The mob exploded and was replaced by the novelty of new
communication. Just as in Niven’s (1973) novella, once the flash crowd was diagnosed as
having been caused by the teleportation booth, the communications had moved on and
those seeking to explain the communication were succinctly informed “you’re not news
anymore” (p.63).
Flash Mob as Organizational Form
“Who would be caught in a riot? Anyone with a cause.
Anyone who wants the ear of the public. There are
newsman here man! And cameras! And publicity!”
Larry Nivens, Flash Crowd (p.11)

Although the “flash mob” aesthetic is identifiable and communicates something specific,
such as sense of playful kynicism or an ironic critique of human being’s relationship to
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technology, the creation of sudden, large groups of people through the utilization of
technology is not limited to that aesthetic or the purposes of the original MOB project. In
fact the technological capacity to make mediated social networks physically manifest,
which is a necessary component of aesthetic flash mobs, predates the “flash mob” as we
have discussed it above, even occurring as early as the 1990s. Kluitenberg (2006)
anecdotally describes such an early physical manifestation of technological networks; one
such being a “fair sized riot” of Moroccan youths in Amsterdam following a wrongful
arrest, which, much to the surprise of Amsterdam authorities, instantaneously laid siege
to an Amsterdam police station (p. 7). This sudden protest was the result of the youth’s
utilization of early text−messaging services, then free, with which they could text their
entire contact lists. As the message was forwarded by the receiver, the sent messages
replicated themselves across the recipients’ contacts, constructing an instantaneous
protest. Similarly, Kluitenberg describes a London-based organization, known as
“Reclaiming the Streets”, which hosted illegal “street raves” organized by utilizing a
combination of free text messaging and group messaging to contact lists. They sent
instructions that the rave would occur at a preselected time and randomly somewhere in
the city, with the location being indicated by a plume of orange smoke. Reclaiming the
Streets staged car collisions, blocking off two adjacent intersections, and then released
smoke bombs to indicate the location of the then empty street where the rave would
commence.
What such anecdotes points towards is that the “flash mob,” as it has become
known today, can be discussed not only as an aesthetic movement, as we have above, but
can also as a form of organization. While communicating via the organization of the flash
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mob, first made infamous by projects such as the MOB Project or Improve Everywhere,
participants can convey specific meaning, but communicating via flash mob can be
removed from the meaning it was structured to convey.
Marketing Flash Mobs
Arguably the most prevalent use of flash organization, beyond aesthetic flash mobs, is for
marketing, although, for reasons we will see, it is impossible to tell exactly how prevalent
because the “marketing” component of the flash mob is often obscured. Sometimes
identified by marketing researchers as most successful example of flash mob marketing,
T-Mobile’s “Life’s For Sharing” campaign consisted of three separate flash mobs in
London. On January 15th, 2009, at the Liverpool Street Station of the London
Underground, T-Mobile hosted a flash mob for less than three minutes, where a set of
pre-selected, rehearsed dancers randomly interrupted commuters daily routines by
dancing to a medley of well-known pop songs and inciting the audience to join in as
participants. The resulting commercial from the event was viewed by more than 11
million users on YouTube and was voted the “Best Television Commercial of the Year”
by British Television and Advertising Awards (Grant 2013).
Four months later, T-Mobile hosted an even larger flash mob event in which over
13,500 random Londoners were handed microphones and asked sing along to an
extended version of the Beatles “Hey Jude” in Trafalgar Square
(www.youtube.com/user/lifesforsharing). The event included a “surprise” appearance
from the artist Pink. The video implies she was just another random participant, yet,
mystically, her microphone was high enough so that she was distinctly heard above the
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Figure 7 Pink Amid a Sea of Sharing Cameras at T-Mobile’s “Sing Along” Flash Mob (retrieved from
www.youtube.com 11/28/2014)

thousands of other voices. With image after image of happy faces united by the same
totemic track, and phones raised in the air recording the occasion, the message becomes
brilliantly clear: cell phones do not atomize, they unite. Life is for sharing, and it is
cellular technology and T-Mobile making it happen. The flash mob was viewed on
YouTube over 9 million times and a commercial that was generated from the
performance aired on 80 different channels worldwide (Grant 2013).
In October 2010, T-Mobile ended this campaign with a similar event held at the
International Terminal of Heathrow Airport, where singers randomly broke into song and
approached returning travelers. Even without the mass participation by the audience
typical of a flash mob, the “Welcome Back” commercial also won a “Best Television
Commercial of the Year Award” by the British Arrow Awards (Grant 2013).

28

Marketing-based flash mobs in differ, in some significant ways, from the flash
mob as it was practiced by Wasik and groups like Improv Everywhere. They don’t rely
on physicalizing digital connections (e-mail chains, Facebook friends, et al…). Also, as
Brejzek (2010) points out, marketing flash mobs have a hierarchical rather than
egalitarian structured. These mobs often rely on professional performers and, while they
still often involve mass participation from the audience, the audience members are not a
part of the “planning” phase of the mob and are unaware of its existence until is suddenly
springs upon them. Despite these organizational differences, it may be less useful to try
and determine “whether” such flash mobs constitute a flash mob “or” not. All
communications that occur via flash mobs, other than those of the initial aesthetic flash
mobs, involve a transformation even if it is limited to a transformation of the content of
the communication. It is, however, useful to note how the organizational structure of the
communication co-evolves with changes in the meaning content of what the flash mobs
seeks to communicate, rather than categorize the authenticity of the flash mob.

Figure 8 Flash Mob America’s Janet Jackson Promotion (retrieved from www.flashmobamerica.com
11/28/2014)
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Similar to T-Mobile’s event, the German telecommunication cooperation
Deutsche Telekom held a “flash” event on November 9th 2009, the anniversary of fall of
the Berlin Wall, in the Leipzig Central Train Station. A general call was announced
online for participants to come and sing Beethoven’s “Ode to Joy” (Brejzek 2010). As in
T-Mobile’s “Sing Along,” Deutsche Telekom organized a surprise appearance, this time
by opera singer Paul Potts. Although differing in cultural context, the event’s meaning is
nearly identical to “Life’s for Sharing.” The “Ode” is itself a hymn to the unification of
the “brotherhood” of mankind. The fall of the Berlin wall brings to consciousness the
image of the re-unification of Germany. When taken with the context of the flash mob,
the performance points to the unifying capacity of the cellular.

One of the events that most significantly impacted flash mob marketing was the
concurring events of the death of Michael Jackson and the release of Janet Jackson’s
Number Ones album, which resulted in the creation of several permanent for-profit flash
mob companies. The best documented of these companies is Flash Mob America, whose
founders, Staci Lawrence and Conroe Brooks organized over 300 people to participate in
their first for-profit marketing event (Brown 2013). Since then, Flash Mob America has
hosted marketing events for television shows (Glee, Modern Family, and Rachel Ray) as
well as media events for Dell, Oreo, and Oscar Meyer (www.flashmobamerica.com). In
2013 Flash Mob America reformulated itself as a national production company (Brown,
2013). Flash Mob America, like most for-profit flash mob marketing firms, tries to
obscure its relationship to its clients to give the audience an impression of an “organic”
flash mob. This is seen in events organized by Flash Mob America. For instance, in 2009
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Figure 9 Julien Rey and the Bay Area Flash Mob on ABC 7 Live (retrieved from
www.bayareaflashmob.com 11/27/2014)

when they organized a flash mob for Janet Jackson’s album, despite Janet Jackson
appearing in person, Lawrence and Brooks distinctly gave the impression the flash mob
was not connected to marketing. During an interview by ABC, they stated “We’re huge
Janet Jackson fans and we just thought it would be awesome if we could get all her fans
together to dance for her to all of her favorite choreography, from all her favorite videos”
(Retrieved from www.flashmobameric.com 12/12/2014).
On the surface, it may appear what Flash Mob America does−using volunteer
labor and obscuring its connections to clients−may be disreputable. However, if we
embed our understanding within marketing research’s larger discussion of viral
marketing, and specifically the use of flash mobs in viral marketing, what for-profit flash
mobs are doing neither seems underhanded nor abnormal. The recent decline of
traditional forms of mass media has driven marketing researcher to seek an understanding
of how user-driven media (YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, et al.) can be used for corporate
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marketing campaigns−a form of marketing that has come to be known as viral marketing.
In essence, viral marketing seeks to understand how the tendency of internet phenomenon
to “go viral” can be harnessed to create buzz for companies or non-profit entities. Much
of this research has found that if customers perceive they are being marketed to through
online media the marketing campaign backfires on clients. Research on viral marketing
with flash mobs has found the same to be true. If consumers feel the flash mob is
organized for “intrinsic” purposes, independent of a client’s interest, it can be an
extremely effective form of marketing. On the other hand, if consumers are aware that the
flash mob is an online marketing device, then it is likely to garnish ill will towards clients
(Grant 2013; Plangger 2013; Ryan 2011).

Figure 10 One Degree Events Microsoft Sponsored Flash Mob (retrieved from www.onedegreeevents.com
11/28/2014)

32

Since for-profit flash mobs need obscurity to fill clients needs, it is difficult to tell
whether an organization constructing flash mobs is, in fact, for-profit. Many of these
organizations, like Flash Mob America, started after flash mobs commemorated Michael
Jackson’s death and Janet Jackson’s album. One such organization is Bay Area Flash
Mob (BAFM), a flash mob organization lead by Julien Rey−a charismatic and eccentric
French choreographer−who, along with his flash mobbers, adorns himself in Michael
Jacksonesque paramilitary uniforms. The dancers, with the exception of Rey, are
volunteers. BAFM has performed flash mobs for major artists such a Lady Gaga,
Beyoncé, and Britany Spears. BAFM has also made numerous television appearances,
predominately on San Diego’s ABC 7 (www.bayareaflashmob.com). Two other
companies who are openly for-profit flash mob companies are One Degree Events and
Big Hits Flash Mobs. These both specialize in hosting events for large multi-national

Figure 11 Big Hits Flash Mobs IBM World Leadership Conference Performance (retrieved from
www.bighitflashmobs.com 11/28/2014)
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corporations.6 One Degree Events, a Seattle based company, has held marketing events
for Microsoft, Wells Fargo, The Seattle Seahawks, Expedia.com, and the Fox
Broadcasting Company. Big Hit Flash Mobs, likewise, has organized flash mobs for J.P
Morgan, Chase Financial, IBM, and Redbox (www.onedegreeevents.com;
www.bighitflashmobs.com).
In addition to large marketing events for corporations, most flash mob
organizations also organize flash mobs to publicize non-profit events, fundraisers, and
political gatherings. They also organize “flash mobs” for private events like conferences
and corporate conventions. They can even be hired for small private gatherings and
personal events such as wedding proposals and birthday parties
(www.onedegreeevents.com; www.bighitflashmobs.com; www.bayareaflashmob.com;
www.flashmobameric.com).
Art Promotion and Flash Mobs
A specific form of marketing that needs special consideration is that of high art via flash
mob. The largest example of this was created by The Knight Foundation, a non-profit arts
promotion foundation (Friesen 2012; Goodale 2010). Between 2010 and 2012 The
Knight Fondation hosted over 1,000 events in major cities across America that they
termed “Random Acts of Culture”−promoting symphonies, operas, coral chambers, and
ballets in those cities (www.knightarts.org). One of the most famous and largest of these

6

One Degree Event’s, although openly for-profit, still differentiates its image for flash mob volunteers and

the clients that employ them, even having separate websites for volunteers by hosting a separate website for
them. Clients who employ them are directed to a different page (www.onedegreeevents.com).
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Random Acts of Culture was conducted during the 2010 holiday season by Opera
Philadelphia: 650 area choral singers randomly broke into song in a downtown Macy’s
department store. The performance has received 8 million hits on YouTube from viewers
in over 100 nations (http://www.operaphila.org).
What differentiates the marketing of art through organizations like The Knights
Foundation from other flash mob marketing is the intention, or meaning, ascribed to the
flash mob by arts advocates. Friesent’s (2012) Chorus America article “The Human
Singing Voice in the Age of Twitter,” written in response to a series of choral flash mobs
hosted in Ontario, displays this anterior logic. He refers to the choral mobbers as “cultural
angels” who “celebrate the human voice and its power” (p. 18). That, by promoting these
arts, mobbers are providing “the still point in a turning world” (p. 18) because “the purity
and beauty of the human singing voice remains a constant” (p.14). While encouraging
such forms of promotion, he continues: “you educate, reach out, record, broadcast and
commission…You share your way of making music and aim for the highest artistic
level…You contribute to a healthy culture.” The message is clear: by promoting arts via
flash mob, you enculturate those who consume the online mediation of high art and teach
them of its intrinsic value.
Organizers of art-promoting flash mobs have made similar statements. Shayne
Miller, who organized 130 dancers to perform a scene from the musical Hairspray for the
Paper Mill Play house, states, “all the art forms beyond TV and movies are
struggling…the goal is to move community members to see the theater as part of their
lives, not as off in some remote building” (Goodale 2010). Another example is John
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Figure 12 The Opera Company of Philadelphia’s “Halleluiah!” Random Act of Culture” (retrieved
www.youtube.com/channel/UCEjzGkTvtcrSAo4a5JFyLQg)

Davis, who interrupted an Orlando train station with a Venetian waltz, stating, “The goal
is to show people how much fun it is to dance” (Goodale 2010). Or, as Opera
Philadelphia claims on its website: “Its language is the lyric of humanity. Its written in
our genetic code. It meets you in the streets. It lifts you to ecstasy….Think opera’s not for
you? Are you not human?” (http://www.operaphila.org).
Here the shift in thought between early flash mobs and other communications
which animate the flash mob to display its own content can most clearly be felt. The flash
mob, as envisioned by Wasik, was meant to be a physical manifestation of the
meritlessness of internet culture. For Wasik, the significance of the flash mob form was
that the culture episode it produced was devoid of actual meaning or substance. It was a
product of pure mass behavior. This diametrically opposes later interpretations of a flash
mob’s purpose as constructed for high arts promotion. The latter perceive their flash
mobs as being about the specific significance of the content of the flash mob: the singing,
dance, or performance. The flash mob is simply the conduit that allows them to gain
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attention, and thus communicates the significance of the art to the consumers they view
as ignorant of its merit.
Political Flash Mobs
The most natural leap (one that, as we will see later, most academics writing about flash
mobs would like to see flash mobs communicate) is to utilize the flash mob for political
communication. The naturalness of this step is partially due to an association. Because of
the large protest movements of the twentieth century, from the Civil Rights protests of
the 1960s to the more recent Occupy movement, there is a natural association between
political action and large crowds, one that many of the aesthetic flash mobs ironically and
playfully mocked. The International Pillow Fight Day is one such example, where large
numbers of participants amass on the National Mall in Washington, D.C−the location of
many of the most iconic protests in American history−to engage in a massive pillow fight
(Muse 2010).

Figure 13 International Pillow Fight Day (retrieved from 2013internationalpillowfightday.com
12/10/2014)
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Despite this “natural” association, and, as we will also see, much to the chagrin of
scholars, flash mobs and flash organizing have not been as common (at least in the West)
as a form of political activism as they have been for marketing and artistic expression.
Despite this, various forms of political content have been communicated via flash mob.
Much of the communication of political content follows a similar pattern to marketing
flash mobs; they garner as much attention as possible to promote a specific political
institution, ideology, or set of policies.
In 2012, the city steering committee of Mesa, Arizona organized a series of flash
mobs at local shopping malls as part of its “iMesa” program, seeking civic input to
identify projects important to local residents. This exhibits the communicative character
of flash mobs. The city of Mesa utilized the flash mob to communicate to the local
residence and draw attention to the city’s initiatives (Heirshberg 2012). Likewise, a
number of public colleges have utilized flash mobs in a similar manner to Mesa.7
College-organized flash mobs appear to take two forms. One form is the college
administration organizing student flash mobs in hopes the videos will go viral as a PR
tool to promote the school to potential students and donors (Louise 2010). The other
utilization is for increasing student enthusiasm for specific events. Flash mobs have been
organized at Buffalo State College and the College of Charleston for orientation, at MIT
7

Public colleges hosting flash mobs includes but is not limited to Ohio State, MIT, Texas A&M,

University to Minnesota-Mines, Colorado State University, California State University-San Marcos,
Buffalo State College, University of Cincinnati, Oregon State University, Portland State University,
College of Charleston, University of Tennessee-Chattanooga, University of West Virginia, University of
Alabama-Birmingham.
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and the University of Minnesota-Mines for university’s anniversary celebrations, and at
Portland State College for commuting the opening of an electric-vehicle-only street
(Lewin 2011).
It is interesting that even though such flash mobs are obviously “institutional,” the
communications themselves can be university sponsored, hosted by an independent
student organization, or some combination of both. The flash mobs at Portland State, the
University of Minnesota, and MIT were all independently sponsored and organized by
campus fraternities and sororities. The orientation flash mob at Buffalo State was funded
and executed administratively (Lewin 2011).
Not only have state institutions utilized flash mobs, but also so have some large
private institutions. Included in this are a slew of private colleges who communicated
with their

Figure 14 Time Square Arts=Ammo Flash Mob (retrieved from ArtAmmo.org 12/17/2014)
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students similarly to the state institutions (Louise 2010; Lewin 2011).8 Similarly, at St.
Vincent Hospital in Worcester, MA, Registered Nurses utilized the flash mob to
communicate internally to the hospital administrators their concerns over a decreasing
RN to Patient ratio within the hospital (St. Vincent 2011).
Beyond flash mobs being used for communication within institutions of
governance either internally or externally, flash mobs have also been utilized to gain
publicity for specific policy issues by protest organizations. One such example is by the
organization Arts=Ammo, founded by Broadway choreographer Lorin Latarro.
Arts=Ammo choreographed flash mobs utilizing viral communications to refocus
audience attention on the (perceived) need for increased gun-control. Latarro’s first mob,
involving 250 participants, was held in Times Square in February of 2013. The
performance consisted of participants, organized in pairs, melting to the ground with one
partner lying flat in a corpse-like pose, while the other kneeled above. After holding the
pose for eight seconds, the kneeling partner drew a chalk outline around the body of their
still motionless partner. With the performance complete, the participants disbanded,
leaving behind empty outlines signifying those killed in gun violence (Kay 2013). Latarro
has replicated this flash mob in ten cities across the United States, with an additional four
events planned for 2015 (artammo.org). Similar flash mobs have been hosted over other
policy issues. For example, Occupy held a flash mob in 2012 to protest the National
Defense Act and in 2014 to protest the Ferguson shooting. The Fried Squirrels, a
8

Private colleges hosting flash mobs include Wesleyan University, Hood College, Wheaton College,

Merrimack College, Emerson College, Wellesley College, Mary Washington, Kalamazoo College, RoseHulman Institute of Technology and Old Dominion University.
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Canadian offshoot of the Occupy Movement, likewise held a flash mob to draw attention
to a Canadian anti-worker bill (Armaghan 2012; Elliott-Buckley 2014; Kamp 2014).
In the United States the use of flash mobs to communicate political content, if the
amount of documentation is taken at face value, appears more limited in scope and scale
than flash mobs communicating marketing content.9 This is less true of how flash mobs
are used in peripheral and semi-peripheral nations. This is particularly true for the former
Soviet Union, where major protest movements have employed the flash mob’s ability to
quickly create and disband large crowds in order to allow protesters to escape the
political ramifications for organizing. Anti-Putin protests in Russia have occurred as well
as protests against the exiling of Natalia Morari from Moldova (Moldoveanu 2009;
Rutland 2009; Weir 2011). The conservative National Alliance Movement has also
utilized flash mobs to ensure electoral success in Latvia (Hanov 2011). Likewise, flash
mob political activities have been seen outside of Eastern Europe in Spain, Angola and
Kenya (Etling 2010; Fominaya 2011; Yarwood 2013).
Charity Flash Mobs
Many flash mobs communicate divergent enough content that they escape easy
classification. Most are still trying to draw attention to a cause, although this cause is less
overtly political as the flash mobs described above. I refer to such flash mobs as
“charitable” flash mobs. This is because most of them are involved in activities that, in
every day parlance, we would refer to as charity. Flash mobs have been utilized by a
variety of non-political causes. Flash mobs, for example, have often been used to

9

Documentation here meaning flash mobs documented in the news media or scholarly sources.
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generate attention to medical issues and promote public awareness for cancer, mental
health, or safe pregnancy practices (Gore 2010; Lowel 2014; Whiteker 2010).
Another area of flash mobs that could be considered “charitable” flash mobbing is
what is often referred to as “cash mobs.” In a cash mob, digital networks are used to
create a sudden influx of donations to charitable organizations or suddenly increase sales
of local businesses. As in other flash mobs, these efforts usually occur in person. One
example occurred in 2012 in Yuma, Arizona, when the Hospice of Yuma canceled their
annual fundraiser, and a “cash mob” was organized in which participants suddenly
flooded the thrift store. The store conducted a month’s worth of business in fewer than
five hours (Petrecca 2012). Also in 2012, a string of cash mobs were organized
throughout Virginia and Tennessee; they aided a struggling stationary store in Roanoke, a
record store in Memphis, a backpacking store in Blacksburg, and a Habitat for Humanity
in Charlottesville (Flandez 2012; Petrecca 2012). The same year, the Genesee Center for
the Arts in Rochester, NY organized a series of cash mobs that resulted in the center
receiving a two thousand dollar grant from the Retail Council of New York State for their
efforts (Flandez 2012).
Also included in this category is the non-profit organization Life Vest Inside,
which takes the utilization of flash mob further than any other organization and could be
characterized as an organization whose sole purpose is to construct a continuous flash
mob. Former middle school teacher, Orly Wahba, founded the organization in 2011. Life
Vest Inside seeks to utilize flash mobs to remind people to be kind to one another in
hopes that, in a manner strangely reminiscent of Mimi Leder’s (2000) Pay it Forward,
the reminder will kick off a chain of random acts of human kindness, eventually resulting
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Figure 15 Orly Wahba Delivering a TED Talk concerning Human Kindness (retrieved from
www.lifevestinside.com 11/28/2014)

in the construction of a better global world (www.lifevestinside.com). Yet, as the
organization explained in its fundraising slogan in December 2012, they need to
constantly seek funds “because flash mobs don’t fund themselves”
(https://www.youtube.com/user/LifeVestInside). In this way, Life Vest Inside may
represent the first self-perpetuating flash mob. Each time the flash mob communicates, it
also constructs the precondition for future flash mobs by becoming an advertisement for
itself. Every year since its founding on November 10th, which it dubs World Kindness
Day, Life Vest Inside hosts a global dance flash mob. In 2014, the flash mob was held in
30 locations, 15 countries, and consisted of 3,500 participants. It is now advertising that
on the next World Kindness Day the dance flash mob will expand to 28 countries
(www.lifevestinside.com).
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Scholarship on Flash Mobs
Scholars have only occasionally organized flash mobs. They have attempted to create
flash research, in which the flash mob is used as an instrument to collect data (Semler
2013). Flash mobs have also been used as a teaching tool (Duran 2006). However,
scholars rarely organize flash mobs, but, rather, write about them. Strikingly, scholarship
on flash mobs has oriented itself towards this phenomenon in a similar way to marketers,
artists, activists, and philanthropists− despite the fact that scholars don’t normally execute
flash mobs. As scholars attempt to “understand” the “meaning” and “significance” of
flash mobs, they transform their object of study by imbuing it with “meanings” they
desire the flash mob to have, much as those who generate them.
Three narratives have been constructed concerning flash mobs: 1) they viewed as
ushering forth a new form of sociality; 2) they are heralded as a new, liberating form of
political engagement; 3) they are co-opted, or potentially co-optable, forms of political
action. These arguments are not mutually exclusive and many studies rely on a
combination of these interpretations. When viewed as a new form of sociality, scholars
focus on the physicalization of technological networks. In Kuitenberg’s (2006) concept of
hybrid space, there exists a particular outcome of flash mobs in which “the public is
reconfigured by a multitude of media and communication networks interwoven into the
social and political functions of space” (p. 8). This hybrid space transforms the
connection between “local and electronic networks: who communicates with whom, and
in what context, is determined differently from one region to another, sometimes even
from one day to the next” (p. 10).
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Similarly, the work of Muse (2010) claims that flash mobs are “guerrillas without
guerre, terrorists without terror, riots without rage…who mourn and mock the ironic
death of communal activity in an over connected age,” an age “when we do venture into
public, we are increasingly sequestered in private bubbles of personal media, shielded by
earbuds and smartphones from face to face interaction. Public spaces, as a result, are
more than ever becoming sites of isolation” (p. 10-12). By rendering the technological
ties physical, flash mobs “stage a digitally enabled in-your-face revolt against the erosion
of face-to-face interaction in a digital nation” (p.12). In both Kuitenberg and Muse we see
a specific meaning being attached to the flash mob, a singular significance, that the flash
mob possess the ability to alter the tide of changes in human interaction brought about by
the re-socializing of technical communications because the mobs can make technological
connections physically manifest.
Similar to scholars who point to the flash mob as a new form of sociality are
scholars who interpret the flash mob as new form of political engagement with the
potential to alter the future of political action. Probably the leading work in interpreting
flash mobs this way is Rheingold’s (2003) Smart Mobs (published the same year as
Wasik’s first flash mobs) in which he claims that, if properly organized ahead of time,
cellular technology could result in a Gutenberg-like moment of human growth. Part of
this potential, Rheingold explains, is the new democratic potential of the flash mob
resulting from its ability to coordinate itself via technological media. That “smart mobs,”
as he prefers to call them, have the potential to allow for new forms of organization as
politically active protest movements increasingly function via self-organization. Smart
mobs marry the independence from direct control or influence by any one member with
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the ability of information to pass easily between members. Borrowing on game theory,
Rheingold claims that the smart phone’s capacity to offer perfect information to mob
members allows it to function as a “co-operation amplifier” (p. 157-180). In short, as a
result of their suddenness and lack of centralized control, Rheingold claims “mobs”
organized via cell phone technology have the potential to alter politics by flattening
relationships of power.
Another manifestation of the theme of flash mobs being politically transformative
is in research viewing the flash mob as a juxtaposition to the authoritarian politics
surrounding to the physical organization of space in cities. Kaulingfreks and Warren
(2010), in their study of flash clubbing, see the flash mob as the natural juxtaposition of
the “hieratical Tayloristic organizational forms” which are usually imposed upon cities.
Flash mobs expose a secret about cities, that “despite…planning and management…the
city always seems to be in permanent state of disorder, like a beehive or a swarm. All that
planners achieve are either vast expanses of empty (but ordered) spaces devoid of life or
spaces that are taken over by the swarm” (p.214). That in “these fluid breathing cities
there emerges as a kind of rhizomatic social space that emerges in the gathering of
people” (p. 214).
Similarly Brejzek (2010), in his study on the scenographies of flash mobs,
associates the flash mob’s sudden manifestation of physical bodies out of viral networks
with a disruption of authoritarian city planning. As he explains:
The non-hierarchical digital grammar of virtual communities. Its
temporary scenography of still or moving bodies alter the perception of
the urban everyday and makes the system of urbanity ‘stutter,’ if only for a
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moment. Even in their predominately ‘fun’-manifestations, flash
mobs…temporarily unsettle the seamless functioning of contemporary
urban consumerist choreographies as spatial figures of resistance. (p. 122)
The mirror image of this scholarship are attempts, mainly in criminology and
psychology, to theorize combating flash mobs, which are understood as mainly a criminal
or anti-social force (Massaro 2011; Molnar 2014; Houston 2013; Seo 2014; Smith 2012).
In both, a language of “disorder” is harnessed to describe the flash mob. The underlying
difference is the meaning ascribed to the perceived transformative capacity. In
psychological and criminological studies of flash mobs, their transformative potential is
framed as a threat to existing social order.
Finally, even within many of the interpretations of flash mobs as a source of
liberation, other potential outcomes for flash mobs are identified, which are usually
framed as the flash mob’s potential co-option. For instance, Grainge (2011) discusses the
corporate co-option of the flash mob in T-Mobile’s Life’s for Sharing campaign.
Klutenberg (2006) explains that hybrid spaces can become sights of control. Brejzek
(2010) points out how corporate led flash mobs have a tendency to fall back into a
hierarchical structure. Even Rheingold (2003), although at moments sepia in his
descriptions of the potential of the smart mob, identifies at least the potential that his
“smart” mobs could just as easily become a “pan-opticon” like technology of control if
humanity does not quickly figure out how to properly organize our use of technology (p.
183-185).
I opened my discussion of current scholarship on flash mobs by claiming that it
simply added another “meaning” to what were already divergent communications by
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actual existing flash mobs. I would like to now point to the apparent disconnection
between much of the scholarship surrounding flash mobs, that is the “meaning” of the
flash mob according to scholars, and the meanings that actual flash mobs have attempted
to convey. Scholars have had a tendency to view the flash mob as having a set meaning,
purpose, or, if you will, essence−that, in the course of political history, after the war has
been waged, flash mobs in general will have a very specific outcome, be it liberation or
co-option. They will reformulate social interaction, alter political practice, usher in
democracy, change sociality, or become an instrument of powerful corporate actors.
Nonetheless, if the multiplicity of meanings communicated via flash mob are analyzed−if
the divergent communications from the MOB project to T-Mobile, from Arts=Ammo to
the Knight foundation, from Improve Everywhere to Life Vest Inside are taken into
consideration−it is difficult to see how such divergent communications could be united
under a single “meaning.” That which has been constructed from the moment that Wasik
sent the first e-mails to today has been anything but an explosion, and expansion, of
communications void of any specific meaning. It appears to me difficult to claim that TMobile’s Life’s for Sharing campaign is non-hierarchical, that Flash Mob America makes
the urban system stutter, or that Orly Wahba−who is, translating into the Deleuzian
language of many of the flash mobs commentators, dripping with faciality−could
possibly be conceived as anti-systemic. In light of the multiplicity of flash mob
communications, it is difficult to ascribe a specific relationship between the flash mob
and social or political structure without having to make claims regarding the
“authenticity” of specific flash mobs in a prescribed manner. Scholar don’t usually
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organize flash mobs, but they do write about them in ways based upon normative
distinctions utilized in scholarly writing. In this way they also transform them.
In the end it is important to note that the flash mob, whatever the original
intention of the event, will communicate to scholars the meanings they wish to find there,
such as a flash mob bringing into existence a new social or political order. This is how a
researcher’s orientation toward the flash mob is identical to marketing or politics
orientation to the flash mob. Rather than a solution to, or explanation of, the multiplicity
of what flash mobs “say,” research simply adds another voice, another layer, to the
“meaning” of the flash mob, and contributes to a confusing cacophony of voices already
communicating through existing flash mobs. Any explanation of the flash mob which
seeks to describe the flash mob in a way consistent with the diversity of communications
conducted by the flash mob, will first have to contend with this multiplicity.
Conclusion
Taken as whole, the flash mob offers us a series of contradictory, or at least disconnected,
narratives. The flash mob, as a way of communicating, has been animated to a playful
critique of technology, to sell cellular service, to support political policy platforms, to
promote human kindness, to help local business, to sell pop albums, to orient students at
universities, to entertain conference guests, and, potentially, to alter social and political
reality. What could possibly be said to make sense of such divergent goals, aims, and
performances? And how, as was promised in the introduction of the dissertation, will
such an exploration illuminate our understanding of the individual’s relationship to social
structure? At the onset, it appears each flash mob has its own separate relationship; some
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reinforce existing social and political reality, while others do not. Through the course of
this dissertation, I will attempt to show that this is not the case. Before doing so, we must
turn to the discussion of structure and agency, and become more explicit about how
sociology defines the “individual” and “social structure.”
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CHAPTER 2: STRUCTURE AND AGENCY
In this chapter structure and agency, via structuration theory in sociology, is introduced,
focusing on Archer (1988; 2001; 2003), Bhaskar (1979; 1986), and Giddens (1976;
1986). This theoretical tradition constitutes what may be identified as the most
monumental shift in our understanding of the interaction be individuals and social
structure in twentieth century sociology. Since it originated the discussion of structure
and agency, it quite literally invented the very language we use in sociology to discuss
this interaction (Varela 2001; Craib 2001). I, therefore, borrowing from Giddens
definition of structure and agency, understand “agency” as “the stream of actual or
contemplated causal interventions of corporal beings in the ongoing process of world
events” (1976, p. 75) and “structure” as the “rules and resources recursively implicated in
social structure; institutionalized features of social systems hav[ing] structural
properties…stabilized across time and space” (1986, p. xxxi). With these definitions in
mind, I will provide a combined explanation of how all three authors perceive a tension
between structural and agent-driven explanations within sociology, outlining each of their
theory’s respective attempts to resolve this tension through explanations of how social
structure and human agents interact and exert casual influence over one another. The final
section of this chapter will re-introduce the structure and agency tensions in the flash mob
narratives via an interpretation of flash mobs through the theories of Archer, Bhaskar,
and Giddens.10

10

In regards to theories of structure and agency this dissertation focuses on a single tradition to

counterpoint its discussion of systems theory as a potential alternative theory of agency. For simplicity’s
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Giddens
Undoubtable, any current theory attempting to elucidate the relationship between social
structure and individuals is indebted to Giddens’ theory of structuration, because the
discussion of the structure and agency divide begins with Giddens (1976; 1986).
Primarily, Giddens re-set the language of the interaction of individuals and social
structure. As Varela (2001) points out, Giddens jettisons the discussion of voluntarism
and determinism, which are marred in metaphysical discussions of free will and
determinism, and replaces it with the distinction between of structure and agency. In
doing so, Giddens theory of structuration attempts to overcome the static divides inherent
in the debate of voluntarism and determinism by positing individuals and social structure
relationally, as caught in a dynamic process, rather than as static entities. As Bryant and
Jary (1991) claim, Giddens “presents structuration theory as an approach to social
science which avoids the dualisms of subject and object, agency and structure, structure
and process, which have so bedeviled other social theories” (p. 2). That Giddens, by
presenting “the dynamic process whereby structures come into being...supersedes these
deficiencies by showing how socials structures are both constituted by human beings and
yet at the same time are the very medium of this construction” (p. 7).

sake some major theories and figures in contemporary social theory discussing the relationship between the
individual and social structure are not considered in detail. For example, Bourdieu (1993), Burger and
Luckmann (1966), and neo-functionalism (Alexander 1998; Mouzelis 2008) are not discussed or only
discussed in passing. I focus on the singular theoretical tradition of structuration theory and its subsequent
embellishment in critical realism because structure and agency is a central theme throughout this tradition.
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Cohen (1998) also illustrates that this process approach to individuals and
structure “provides the basis for the reconciliation of action and structure” (p. 41). For
Giddens, the interaction is inherent in the terms structure and agency which “presuppose
one another in social life” (p. 9-10) marries a “collectivist approached which treat agents
malleable and manipulatable constituents of social life, who are guided or directed in
their social conduct by supra-individual forces” (p. 47) and agent driven approaches
which perceive individuals’ actions as constituting society.
All three of the theorists discussed in this section (Archer, Bhaskar, and Giddens),
in regards to structure and agency, seek to understand the specific causal powers that
structure and agents possess over one another, which we could call the interactions
between structure and agents. In Giddens’ theory of this interaction these separate causal
powers are determined by the very process which he is claiming overcomes the
theoretical issues of understanding the interaction between social structure and
individuals, this process that Giddens calls “structuration.” Structuration is mainly a
function of 1) the unintended consequences of human actions, and 2) the unconscious
actions of human

Figure 16 The Interplay Between Structure and Agent for Giddens (1984, p. 5)
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beings. According to Giddens, when human beings act, their actions always possess
unforeseen consequences, of which the individual is unaware. Even actions about which
we are the most reflexive, actions for which we most clearly intended the outcomes,
hidden consequences lurk underneath to which we have no access.11
As the consequences of our actions extend out into the future, these consequences
provide the background, the restrictions and resources, upon which our future actions
depend. However, since we are unware of their existence, they do so without our full
knowledge. This is the moment of structuration, the birth of social structure, and the
instrument by which structure replicates itself. This is also the moment where we see the
effect of unconscious actions in Giddens’ model. This is because the unintended and
unacknowledged consequences are replicated by human beings in an unconscious
manner. They often act in ways that reinforce the unacknowledged conditions of their
actions without realizing these conditions. In this way, the unintended consequences of
conscious actions transform themselves into future unconscious actions in a constant loop
(1984, p. 5-8).
Within this loop we approach what Giddens calls “the duality of structure.” This
is the interaction between the constraints of social structure and conscious human actions
11

According to Cohen (1989) this reflexive monitoring of actions, inherent in all human acts, is the catalyst

for agency, defining the difference between Giddens and previous theories of individuals and social
structure. Giddens perceives “the agent, in the first instance, as a human being engaged in the process of
the constitution of social life” (p. 48). This displays that, according to Cohen’s reading, agency is possessed
by human beings from the beginning. They possesses the capacity for reflectivity somewhat automatically
despite the fact that the agency and structure are mutually contingent.
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that alters social structure but then constructs future constraints, becoming future social
structures, which then binds human action in the future. As Giddens (1984) explains:
The duality of structure is always the main grounding of continuities in
social reproduction across time-space. It in turn presupposes the reflexive
monitoring of agents in, and as constituting, the duree of daily social
activity. But human knowledgeability is always bounded. The flow of
action continually produces consequences which are unintended by actors,
and these unintended consequences also may form unacknowledged
conditions of action in a feedback fashion. Human history is created by
intentional activities but is not an intended project; it persistently eludes
efforts to bring it under conscious direction. (p. 26-27)
In other words, the duality of structure, the interaction between human agents and social
structure, is the result of the interplay between the “intentional activities” of human
beings and the effect of the unintended consequences of these actions. In this way, for
Giddens, individuals have their causal independence and their ability to construct novel
plans for action that have a transformative effect on social structure. Conversely, social
structure possesses its own causal efficacy towards individuals both by constructing the
often-unacknowledged restrictions and resources utilized by these intentional actions and
by silently replicating itself in the unconscious actions of the actors themselves.
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Bhaskar12
For Bhaskar, the interaction between social structure and human agents is understood
through a phenomenon known as emergence. As Elder-Vass (2007a; 2007b; 2007c),
Kontopoulos (1993), and Sawyer (2001) all discuss, emergence is really the application
12

As both Collier (1994) and Outhwaite (1987) identify, Bhaskar’s starting point for his discussion of

agency is not to identify agency, but to provide an epistemological justification for the existence of social
science. Agency is the necessary precondition for justifying our understanding of society for Bhaskar
(1979; 1986) because, if we are not capable of acting and thinking outside of societal influences, then there
is no reason to identify the social science as possibly being able to generate a better knowledge of society.
Thus, for Bhaskar, the ontological existence of human agency is tied to any theory of human knowledge.
He, therefore, wishes to display the possibility that individuals possess reflectivity in regards to their own
action and thoughts with the capacity for transcending their corporal being. As Sayer (2001) points out
knowledge and agency for Bhaskar are not separate occurrence; they are the same thing. Without the ability
to know the social world there is no agency and, without agency, we could not possible posit the social
world. He also explains this via emergence, particularly the emergent properties of the human mind beyond
the merely physical neural passages of the body, out of which the activity of thought emerges. This
transcendence allows for a realism, outside of physiological constraints, just as society possesses properties
that transcend the human individuals from which it is composed. This provides Bhaskar’s epistemological
justification for “realist science.” Using the concept of emergence and an adaptation of Giddens
structuration theory, he attempts to prove the existence of human agency as a justification of the existence
of social science and a realist science.
Finally, the epistemological differences between Luhmannian systems theory and Bhaskar’s’
statement of agency as a precondition for any knowledge of social structure should be noted. For Luhmann
(1996; 1998; 2012; 2013), claiming that all communication occurs as systemic communication (as social
structure) leads systems theory to construct a epistemology capable of understanding society from within
society, the act of second ordered observation explained in more detail in chapter 3.
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of a concept borrowed from philosophy and the physical sciences that was designed to
overcome reductionism resulting from the atomic, molecular, and neural sciences. Instead
of simply possessing aggregate properties of the atoms, elements, or neurons,
independent emergent properties were identified at the level of a physical object,
chemical compound, or human brain that could only be explained at this higher level of
analysis. One of the clearest examples of such discussions in philosophy and the physical
sciences is the example of water offered by Mills (1900). Many of the properties of water
are not aggregated from its elements. For instance, neither hydrogen nor oxygen are
liquid at room temperature nor are able to put out fires. The atoms that compose these
elements also do not possess these properties. Such properties, therefore, only emerge in
the particular synthesis of these elements. In this way, it is fair to claim that water has an
independent existence resulting from its independent properties or the elements out of
which it is built.
Bhaskar utilizes this concept to comprehend the relationship between agents and
social structure. Like particles of water, Bhaskar’s society, while composed of concreate
human individuals, possesses emergent properties that allow it to have causal efficacy
over human beings. Conversely, for Bhaskar this provides human beings with the ability
to transform or reproduce social structure as a result of human beings providing the
actions out of which social structure emerges. This is why, as both Collier (1994) and
Outwaith (1987) identify, agency occurs in the interaction between distinct entities for
Bhaskar. What imbues individuals and social structure with distinctness, is in fact the
emergent qualities of social structure.
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Figure 17 Bhaskar’s “Transformational Model of the Society/Person Connection” (1979, p. 36)

The relationship between society and individuals that results form Bhaskar’s
(1979) emergence is nearly identical to Giddens’ conception of unconscious action and
allows one to say
…without paradox or strain, that purposefulness, intentionality and
sometimes self-consciousness characterized human actions but not
transformations of social structure. The concept that I am proposing is that
people, in their conscious activities, for the most part unconsciously
reproduce the structures governing their substantive activities of
production. Thus people do not marry to reproduce the nuclear family or
work to sustain the capitalist economy. Yet it is nevertheless the
unintended consequence of, at it is a necessary condition for, their activity.
(p. 35)
Individuals, as the atoms of the system, possess the ability to act according to their own
volition, and these actions are causally effective towards society−that is, they have
agency. As Bhaskar “more or less dogmatically asserts” (p. 81) that agency is a
“fundamental feature or power” (p. 80) for individuals. Likewise, asserting their causality
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since, as Sayer (2001) identifies without causality, agency and knowledge of the social
structure, for Bhaskar, would be pointless:
The freedom to re-describe ourselves is worthless, unless the discourse is
preformative, that is causal. For changes in discourse to be casually
effacious or successfully performative, and not just by accident, we must
know something about how the determinations we want to avoid work,
and how they can be subverted, block or replaced by more wanted and
perhaps novel determinations, and we must make appropriate causal
interventions.. Without causality any concept of responsibility, agency and
freedom is meaningless, for we can only be responsible for what we
influence. (p. 97)
Like Giddens’ unintended consequences, the emergence of the social system allows
these structures to influence individuals, Bhaskar recognizes this primarily through the
process of socialization. The concept of emergence allows the relationship between
human beings and social structure to be one of a mutual causal influence in which society
influences individuals’ behavior while simultaneously emerging out of individuals’
behaviors.
In addition this, as both Collier (1994) and Outhwaith (1987) identify, Bhaskar’s
model of structure and agency borrows heavily upon Giddens, particularly the concept of
the “duality or structure,” as a solution to tensions between the determinism of social
structure (for Bhaskar “structuralism”) and individuals (for Bhaskar “humanism”). This
interaction Bhaskar re-terms as the “duality of praxis,” renewing focus on both the
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structure and agency as the product of human actions. In this practiced duality, once the
system had emerged from the individual as in independent causal entity, then both the
individual and social structure are maintained in a process, an interaction, nearly identical
with Giddens, complete with a division between conscious and unconscious actions.
Individuals and social structure are thus united in the praxis of the individual for Bhaskar.
Collier (1994) in his Critical Realism even describes Bhaskars’ duality of praxis in nearly
identical terms to Giddens’ duality of structure, as an identification that “society is both
the ever present condition (material cause) and the continually reproduced outcome of
human agency. And praxis is both work, that is conscious production, and (unconscious)
reproduction of the conditions of production, that is society” (p.45-46).
As a result of these similarities between Bhaskar and Giddens, which will be
displayed later, Bhaskar both inherits and expounds upon the conditions, within Giddens
that maintains an antagonism and separation between the individual and social structure,
despite constructing a theory that overcomes the theoretical antagonism between
structural and individually centered explanation of our interaction with our social world.
In this way, their theories almost internalize the antagonism, rendering it as an
ontological problem (an existent tension which typifies the real relationship between
individuals and social structure) rather than as an epistemological problem (a limitation
our theorizing).
One final note is needed. In addition to providing societal emergence as an
explanation of the structure/agency relationship, Bhaskar also provides it as a justification
for emancipatory politics: “It is only if social phenomenon are truly emergent…that there
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is any possibility of human self-emancipation” (p. 104). This is because, as a
precondition for any transformative model of social activity, society must be seen as an
independent phenomenon from natural phenomenon and as dependent upon the
transformative potential of human agency. Bhaskar claims that without society as an
emergent phenomenon this is impossible and, therefore, human beings acting with
agency is a precondition for social change and emancipatory action (that is the exertion of
human agency over the emerged system). Likewise, society must be emergent if there is
to be something to emancipate oneself from; society must provide constraints and
conditions beyond that of immediate human action (p.123-129).
Archer
Archer, in many ways, provides a converse but complimentary explanation to Giddens
and Bhaskar. While Giddens, with structuration, and Bhaskar, with emergence, try to
explain how social structure gains independent causal powers from human agents, Archer
attempts to explain the process through which human beings possess agency. She focuses
on how, despite processes of socialization, human beings could still be considered an
independent causal force within social structure.
Archer (2001) challenges the commonly accepted view that society and its
influences precede the individuals within it and claims that human beings possess forms
of consciousness that precede the influence of society on them. This is the result of what
she calls the “primacy of practice.” For Archer, the construction of the human self and its
differentiation from the external world does not occur through the use of language or
learning to see oneself as an object by the identification of others. Instead she contends
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that one gains a sense of self pre-linguistically: “the self is an emergent relational
property whose realization comes about through the necessary relations between
embodied practice and the non-discursive environment” (p. 123). In other words, it is in
the utilization of one’s body in everyday practice that one gains the understanding of
one’s own existence and one’s separation from the external world. Accordingly the
individual cannot be seen as determined by society in general, or language in particular,
since the origin of their sense of self “is wordless, and necessarily so because it is both
pre-linguistic and a-linguistic, then it cannot rest upon any concept appropriated from
society” (p. 124).
Accordingly, it is with this embodied sense of self that individuals interact with
society, learn language, gain a deeper concept of themselves, and influence society. This
occurs throughout the process with the same sense of praxi, materiality, and
embodiedness as the initial construction of the self. Therefore, human actors can never be
seen in passive acceptance of society but maintains their own independence. Human
beings carrying this independence into their interactions with society as they are
socialized and become increasingly influenced by society, while also learning to have
increasing influence over society as the socialization process continues that they possess
causal influence over the system. Therefore, Archer uses the concept of the embodied self
to turn the tables on our understanding of socialization. Socialization is not simply
society exerting increasing control over our behavior, thereby inducing conformity from
human beings rather, socialization is the process by which human beings increasingly
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learn to influence society via their own independent forms of selfhood embedded within
society. 13
It is also important to note that, following Bhaskar, Archer identifies society as an
emergent phenomenon. She, therefore, accepts that society gains an independence from
the individual as well, and that human beings, despite possessing a societally independent
physical existence, do not make or have control over society.
Understanding Flash Mobs with Structure and Agency
So, what does all of this have to do with understanding and interpreting flash mobs? To
understand the connection, let us examine an attempt made by the last theorist to connect
her theories of structure and agency to a concrete empirical phenomenon: Archer’s
Structure, Agency and the Internal Conversations (2003). According to Forbes-Pitt
(2011), this study is particularly pivotal to understanding Archer’s theory of agency
because, for Archer, the mental world is central to the construction of agency; it serves as
the actual point of interaction between social structure and the individual. It is therefore
increasingly significant that in this important point of interaction within Archer’s theory
13

As Varela (2001) identifies, Giddens understanding of agency is, like Archers, bound to biological

determinism. For Archer, agency is an issue of development and life course. We develop physiologically
and mentally prior to socialization and thus are a priori individual selves. For Giddens, agency is born via
the psychological structure of human beings, most notably the capacity for reflexive consciousness.
Likewise, structure grows out of human beings psychic capacity for unconscious action. This begs the
question of the source of these capacities. Unless Giddens posits some sort of extra biological and social
source, of which there is no indication in his work, this leads us to the inevitable conclusion that agency
would be the product of the biological-cognitive structuring of human beings.
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we find, what I consider, the clearest statement of one of the fundamental shortcomings
of structuration and critical realism. Within this study, Archer explores her subjects’
utilization of their internal conversations, which she views as a point of interaction
between internalized societal influence and the human agent. She is also interested in the
degree to which these internal conversations construct what she calls reflectivity, which
is an individual’s self-identification as agents capable of influencing society. In the study
Archer interviewed twenty participants concerning their internal conversation. In doing
so she then tried to rank the participants’ reflectivity. She coded them into various
categories ranging from “communicative reflexives” (the least reflexive who are
“preoccupied with the proximate” and whose internal conversations are hypothetical
conversations with “the subjects’ own micro-units”) (p. 209) to “meta-reflexives,” the
most reflexive whose “personal powers…have seized upon a cultural ideal and their
guiding project is to come to embody and express that concern as closely as
possible…their internal conversations are replete with self and societal critique” (p, 347).
In her conclusion she compares the participants to balls in Bagatelle game:
The machine worked vertically; a ball would be released by the player.
The angle at which it hit the rounded top determined its initial downward
trajectory, in the course of which it encountered various cups distributed at
different levels down the face of the machine. If the ball fell squarely into
a cup at any stage, then once it settled, an aperture opened and the ball
disappeared. Alternatively, a ball could ricochet off the edge of a cup,
change direction, but be trapped by another cup lower down, more rarely,
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a ball would career its way (un-trapped) to the bottom in which case it was
released again for another circuit (p. 345).
Just as with the three balls, throughout their life, participants either move towards
reflectivity, that is move towards an ability to utilize their practical consciousness for
societal transformation, towards possessing agency, or they become stuck at various
forms of immediate consciousness. Societal change, for Archer, occurs at the final ball
which reams, unblocked, to the highest form of reflectivity.
Archer’s study gives us a leaping-off point to understand the impact of thinking of
individuals and society in terms of structure and agency we are antagonistic and often
mutually exclusive forces struggling to exert influences over one another. In the study of
internal conversation, we see this in the coding of the private thoughts of her subjects in
terms of their ability to alter society, with meta reflexives being the par excellence of
societal transformation.
We also see similar distinctions being made within Giddens and Bhaskar’s works,
which leads Kilminster (1992) to claim that they understand human beings as possessing
“degrees of systemsness” (p. 94). One such distinction exist between an individual’s
conscious and unconscious actions, as well as between intended and unintended
consequences, which rank actions and outcomes by individual influence, that is by the
amount of agency individual’s possess in these actions and those actions’ outcomes.
Unconscious actions are more a reflection of societal influence via the unacknowledged
consequences of past actions. Conscious actions are more an expression of human
beings’ ability to create projects for societal transformation. Intended consequences, by
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remaining within the consciousness of the individual, are more akin to human agency
while unintended consequences produce the acknowledged conditions for future actions,
and therefore become a “backdoor” for society to influence individuals’ behaviors to
replicate itself.
Extending this observation to flash mobs, we see a similar logic being utilized by
many of the flash mob’s interpreters. This can be seen in the discussions which either 1)
try to justify the flash mob as a moment of human agency and societal change or 2)
display the flash mob as a moment co-opted by social structure.
Interpretations of flash mobs as a moment of human intervention resulting in
societal change have pointed to a variety of attributes of the flash mob that lead them to
identify the flash mob as a moment of human agency over the system.14 One common
interpretation, which argues for the flash mob as a method of obtaining agency over the
system, connects the flash mob with De Certeau’s (1984)concept of the multitude, and
argues that sudden masses of human beings challenge the rational, authoritarian
structuring present within the modern city (Brejzek 2010; Gore 2010; Kaulingfreks 2010;
Molnar 2014; Muse 2010). As Brejzek (2010) explains “the spaces flash mobs inhabit
indoor or outdoor packets of inner city space invariably take on political agency through
the appropriation of public space by large numbers of networked individuals” (p. 116).
He points out that, in this, as De Certeau (1984) calls it, “universe of rented space” (p.
103):
14

Kluitenberg (2006) has pointed out that the “agency” is often “applied as a strategic instrument” (p. 14)

for understanding flash mobs.
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the urban fabric of the postmodern city is designed to include and to
exclude individuals through physical architecture, zoning, and diverse
surveillance systems…understood here as a essentially transgressive act
that stems from the desire to overcome this lack of place and to halt the
eternal mobility of the postmodern metropolis, the flash mob is seen to
operate as a physical articulation of a social networks. It transgresses the
virtual community by moving it into the real and it transgresses the urban
grammar by its stillness where eternal mobility is regarded as structural to
the upkeep of the consumerist city (Brejzek p. 118-119).
Another common interpretation that views flash mobs as essentially an expression
of human agency revolves around the flash mob’s ability to make viral networks
physically manifest. In doing so, interpreters have often identified flash mobs as an effort
by participants to combat technological and structural movements towards increasing
atomization and isolation (Kaulingfreks 2010; Molnar 2014; Muse 2010). Molnar (2014),
for instance, juxtaposes interactions in modernity that typically occur for “instrumental
political and economic purposes” with the new form of sociability found in the flash
mob, a “sociability in its pure form” outside the “serious and significant” in which “no
ulterior end, no content and no result outside itself and the free-playing interacting
independence of individuals takes center stage” (p. 45). Likewise, Kaulingfreks (2010)
makes similar claims that participants work to bring forth new forms of sociality in the
face of changing human interaction in what he calls the “together apart.” In his
description of a 2006 flash mob in where participants simultaneously danced to
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independent MP3 tracks on separate iPods, he quotes a participant discussing this
interactive transformation, stating “the fact that everyone was listening to their own
music meant that people kept drawing into themselves, however much they tried to be
with their friends and have a collective experience. The dancing didn’t only transform the
space and stop people in their tracks-it transformed codes of behavior, not only for the
dancers” (p. 219).
In addition to these attributes that associate flash mobs with human agency,
several authors have made the opposite claim, identifying the flash mob as, at least
potentially, a moment reinforcing social structure. For instance, Grainge (2011) describes
the co-option of flash mobs to promote forms of screen entertainment or reinforce
existing structures surrounding marketing and consumerism. Kluitenberg (2006)
identifies the potential that flash mobs may ultimately result in a reinforcement of
existing social structure and while he identifies the “hybrid space” constructed by flash
mobs as initially a moment of “agency,” he fears that it may “provoke countermeasures”
in which a “dystopian hybrid space” may arise (p. 14-15).15
Conclusion
In this chapter we have analyzed the relationship between structure and agency in the
works of Giddens, Bhaskar, and Archer. In the course of this analysis we have seen that
they posit individuals and social structure as two independent forces sometimes exerting
influence over one another. We then returned to the flash mob and noticed, embedded
within in each narrative the same opposition as Archer, an opposition common within the
15

For more on hybrid space see p. 31.
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structure agency debate, which attempts to understand behavior as either belonging to
structural reinforcement represented or as an expression of human agency. In this binary,
social structure is represented by Archer’s communicative reflexive participants,
Giddens’ unconscious, Grainge’s co-option, and Kluitenberg’s hybrid dystopia; agency is
represented by Archer’s meta-reflexive, Giddens’ consciousness, and the flash mob as
Certeau’s multitude. This style of interpretation excludes the possibility that human
actions may equally be a part of social structure and express human agency. Human
behavior is seen as expressing a limited amount of potential causal influence and
increases in the effect of social structure necessarily negates the influence of human
agency. In the next chapter, we will examine systems theory as an alternative way of
conceptualizing the relationship between the individual and social structure. In this theory
the individual’s ability to influence social structure and structure’s ability to influence
human behavior are not seen as essential oppositional categories but are interconnected in
ways precluded by current theories of structure and agency. In the next chapter we will
utilize Luhmann’s systems theory to provide this type of alternative to the current
conceptualization of structure and agency.
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CHAPTER 3: SYSTEMS THEORY AND HUMAN AGENCY
In this chapter, having outlined the substantive issues of flash mobs and theoretical issue
of structure and agency, I will discuss Luhmannian systems theory and how Luhmann’s
work relates to questions of structure and agency. This chapter consists of four major
sections. The first section entitled Luhmann: An Overview, reviews of some of
Luhmann’s major concepts utilized in this dissertation. It focuses on Luhmann’s
discussion of social systems as autopoietic systems and the interpenetration of those
systems; these are the aspects of Luhmann’s theory most prevalently utilized throughout
the dissertation. While it is the focus of the dissertation, the other portions of Luhmann’s
theory (theory of society, second ordered observation, risk in modernity) which works as
an integrated whole are not discounted, since each aspect of the theory is dependent upon
and provides the basis to construction of other portions of his theory. Nonetheless,
because of the magnitude of Luhmann’s theoretical apparatus, it is necessary to focus this
current work more narrowly on autopoietics and interpenetration which, when taken
together, provide the core of a theory of agency within systems theory. Expansion of the
current study would, indefinitely, benefit from dealing in a more direct manner with other
aspects of Luhmann’s theory, especially his conceptualization of society as the sum total
of all communications, and its ramifications for a systems theory of agency. The second
section entitled Is Luhmann an Anti-Humanist, discusses past interpretations of Luhmann
regarding the relationship between individuals and social structure, addressing the
dissonance of such interpretations with systems research’s overarching goal of
constructing an analysis able to unite divergent substantive issues of sociology−thus
providing an overall vision of society and how such interpretations of Luhmann obfuscate
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his actual theory of individuals and social structure. 16 The final section, entitled Systems
Theory and Agency, discusses Luhmann’s theory of the individual and social structure

16

By the time Luhmann (2012; 2013) establishes himself as a theorist, systems theory has identified that

“society” is a problematic concept. However, Luhmann explains that “society” is a necessary frame of
reference, otherwise those theorizing about system would presume to think that their explanations
concerning system occur “outside” the system being analyzed−a mode of explanation that Luhmann claims
pervades most sociological analysis. Luhmann claims that all communication occurs within society, which
is the aggregate of all social systems. Therefore all systemic communications, communications about
society, can only occur within society. This makes the study of society an appropriate frame from which
divergent substantive issues of sociology can perceive their work as communicating about communication
systems within society without themselves being outside the systemic that is outside society. In this regard,
as well, there are major shifts in the course of Luhmann’s (1995; 2012; 2013) career, between social
system, where he initially outlines his systems theory and Theory of Society, where Luhmann provides his
mature theory of social systems, which culminates in his declaration of society as the totality of
communication. To some degree, the argument of this dissertation is indebted to this shift which has
interesting implications for agency. Since all human communication can be seen as a unified whole, a
singular autopoietic system to which human beings are exterior, this points even more to the need of
understanding agency as something that happens within the communications of society. This would,
likewise, mean that our agency would have to occur within society, even if we ourselves are outside of
society. Since, if we are to communicate with social structure, their communication would automatically
be a part of totality of society. As we will see, within Luhmann’s theory there is also the potential of
influencing these communications even if the communications themselves are part of the society.
It is also instructive to consider the difference between Luhmann’s and Giddens’ definitions of
society. For Giddens (1984) society is “the generalized connotation of social association” (p. 163). It is
only a “connotation” of human actions, a background staging of these interaction. In this way, it is limited
to the unconsciousness of the individual through which it reproduces itself. Luhmann, contrary to Giddens
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which, once liberated from anti-humanistic interpretations, provides the foundations for a
new theory of human agency.
Luhmann: An Overview
Before discussing in detail how systems theory, albeit latently, holds the potential for a
new theory of agency, it is necessary to present a brief overview of Luhmann’s theory.
Luhmann’s theory grows out of the general movement towards systems theorizing, in all
of its complexities across the physical, natural, material, and social sciences as well as
philosophy.17 Borrowing heavily upon Von Bertalanffy (1968), who catalogued the
understanding of society, views society not as the context of interaction but as the interaction, the
communications, themselves. This allows Luhmann to discuss society as both a totality that is not
dependent upon the kind of conformist unity Giddens identifies in Parsons. For Luhmann, positive and
negative, inside and outside, system and environment are all dependent on the structuring of systemic
communication (what I will describe as “coding” in this chapter). In other words, the systemic is not about
similarity but difference. No unity is need for system, even when no communication occurs. It is the
system’s own negative coding of that communication which causes it to not communication. In other
words, a lack of unity is a function of society itself, not a threat to its stability.
17

Inevitably, the reader may desire to ask the question “why systems theory?” This is especially true as a

result of the works of conflict theorists, such as by Dahrendorf (1958; 1959), Coser (1967), and Gouldner
(1970), who vividly displayed systems theory as possessing a latent conformist and conservative agenda.
Sidestepping the issue of whether their portrayal of Parsons is valid, such conformity is not present within
Luhmann’s theory. We will see conflict and disunity actually serving as the catalyst for the growth and
replication of the system, even if this means that all actions, their affirmations or negations, are “part” of
the system for Luhmann. This will be seen in our discussion of the political system for Luhmann in the next
chapter, where the internalization of conflict, not the lack of conflict, makes the political system
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systems theoretical movement throughout academia, Luhmann perceives both forms of
systems theory (one being a shared movement in analytic philosophy and the “hard”
sciences and the other in the social sciences) as an attempt to overcome atomistic
approaches to science, which have resulted not only in dizzying specialization within
disciplines, but an every growing chasms between various disciplines.
In the social sciences, Luhmann’s theoretical position largely grows out of the
works of Parsons and Bateson. As discussed later in the chapter, both Parsons’ theory of
volunteer action and his construction of the AGIL system were attempts to unify
sociology which, according to Parsons, “does not enjoy the kind of integration and

autopoietic. Thus, much of the earlier objections to systems theory appears to be unfounded when
discussing Luhmann. As for its potential benefit, systems theory has been selected as a result of its ability
to deal with a diverse set of phenomenon without reducing these phenomenon to the influence of a single
social system (such as politics or economics). Instead, the systemic quality of communication can be
identified in all communications. This sets the highest hurtle for identifying agency within social structure,
a hurtle that also allows us to identify agency within an ever expanding structure. Systems theory also
enables us to think about what it would mean to be “outside” social systems in novel ways, which will be
displayed throughout the remainder of the dissertation. This novel way of identifying human beings as an
environment to the social system permits us to begin thinking about agency, that is the influence of
individuals, without, as we have seen for structuration theory, the accidental replication of this divide
through the bifurcation of human beings. Finally, systems theory allows us to think about human influence
outside of all the moral trapping which plague existing discussions of agency. Such normative positions of
agency comfort us, allowing us to see agency in what we may like about ourselves and society, but in the
end they become an illusion which we cast upon the world which actually robs us of our knowledge of
agencies potential for increased efficacy in regards to our social worlds.
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directed activity which only a well-articulated generalized theoretical system can give
science” (1945, p. 212) under a theoretical system capable of providing the discipline a
“common core which is not only a body of discrete miscellaneous facts” (1938, p. 652).
Likewise, Parsons (1956; 1964) most notably in his economic and psychological works,
attempts not only to utilize the AGIL system to study diverse social systems, but offers
these observations as a way of uniting across disciplines and creating lines of connections
with sociology.
In anthropology Bateson (1972), himself influenced by Parsons, constructs an
analysis capable of cutting across existing disciplinary boundaries. This occurs through
Bateson’s identification a variety of “forms” which can be seen in divergent structures
occupying our world be they the anatomy of a crustaceans claws or value systems of
tribes, boards of education or schizophrenia, mammalian communications or primitive
art. This fluid analysis leads Bateson’s work to serve as a source of inspiration for
Deleuze and Guattari (1987) who develop rhizomatic theorizing in A Thousand
Plateaus−the book title itself cites Bateson’s work, being derived from a quote from
Bateson comparing the similar structuring of sexual climax with an act of warfare as
“culminations and turning points” (p. 22). Deleuze and Guattari expound upon and refine
this capacity to identify similar non-intuitive connections, such as this climax/warfare
connection referenced in the title, in their own work.
The implicit link between systems theory in the social sciences, represented by
Parsons and Bateson, and systems theory in the hard sciences becomes explicit as
Luhmann freely borrows across these various disciplines, from as diverse scholars as Von
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Foster (1949; 2002) in computer science, Von Glasersfeld (1998) in analytic phisosophy,
Lindeman (1942a; 1942b; 1942c) in ecology, Maturana (1980) and Von Bertalanffy
(1968) in biology, and Brown (2013) in mathematics. Luhmann displays the formal
linkages that occur in between these various disciplines in the hard sciences and liberally
borrows concepts from their fields of study, concepts which had already found in the hard
science system theoretical movement to be present in a gamut of differing objects of
analysis from consciousness to computers, complex equations to pond ecology,
engineered machines to life itself, and reapplies them to social systems. Thus, Luhmann
utilizes these already diversely utilized concepts from the hard sciences in a similar
manner to Bateson’s forms, as identifiable structures found throughout existence. Most
significant of these concepts are autopoietics and self-referentiality. As alluded to in the
introduction, the core of Luhmann’s theory is understanding social structure as being
composed of autopoietic systems of communication. By this Luhmann identifies that
what we have been calling “social structure” thus far in the dissertation is a composition
of communications. The communications of systems are structured autopoietically, in a
manner that determines the continuation and the content of future communications. Each
communication is structured in a way to produce self-similar communications
communicated by the system in the future to continue that social system.
Autopoietic systems communicate through a code, an act of distinction, that
functions similarly to the binary coding of a computer system. Each communication
being communicated can be identified by a social system as either similar (1) or as
dissimilar (0). All self-similar communications (1) are observed by the system, identified,
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and are therefore a part of the system. If a communication is not self-similar (0), then the
system cannot recognize the communication and no communication occurs within the
system. No information is passed. In this way, autopoietic can also be called selfreferential, because they reference themselves when sending and receiving
communications. It is air to call self-similar communications part of the system since they
occur within a given system and are understood by the system. Through this act of coding
the system actually constructs, or even causally determines, the communications being
communicated. If communication is desired, the acts of communication must be
sufficiently self-similar to be coded positively. In this way future communications
become determined by previous communications in a continual loop.18
Through this self-referentiality an autopoietic system constructs itself as a
simultaneously opened and closed system capable of interacting with its complex
environment. It is a closed system since no observation, that is no recognition of
communication, can be made of anything outside the system. This “outside” of the
system constitutes the system’s environment. Systems constantly reflect on their
environment, discuss it yet are incapable of observing or communicating about it except
through reduction. Systems only see their environment through themselves. Thus their
environment, rather than an ontological “outside” of the system, is actually constructed
by the system. Luhmann’s concept of environment is defined solely as the other half of
the binary construction of the system, the (0) coding. Environment is, therefore, always
18

It should be noted that this does not indicate that the system is stagnate. Communications change over

time since they only have to be “sufficiently” self-similar to be recognized by system. Therefore, Systems
can evolve over time.
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only external to the system and, while there is a real non-systemic environment, this
world is eternally unfathomable to the system. Through the recognition of self-similar
elements in a process of coding, systems become closed off from their environment,
which is determined solely by the system’s internal processes.19
Before moving on to describe the “openness” of autopoietics, it is necessary to
identify an irony in the functioning of systems. Systems are constructed as an adaptation
19

This brings us to another major concept in Luhmann’s theory, not explored in this dissertation: second

ordered observation. Whenever we engage in observations, regardless of the mode of observation we are
utilizing, we practice what Luhmann calls first ordered observation. In first ordered observation we always
observe some form of coding, we are use some reductionary tactic to reduce reality based upon the internal
processes of whatever system, or systems, we employ to make the observation. We do this, for the most
part, without acknowledging that a distinction has been made. Luhmann suggests that systems theory can
function as a second ordered observation, in which we observe the act of observation. We observe how
systems conduct first ordered observation and peer behind the unspoken reductionary codes of social
systems. While this is certainly a major focus for Luhmann, for the purposes of this dissertation the
distinction is of secondary importance. Rather than trying to understand a singular social system or society
as a whole, as Luhmann does, I attempt to analyze the mutual influence of a multiplicity of social systems
on a single communication. In addition to this, since I provide an empirical description of flash mobs to
illustrate this interplay of systems, I include both first ordered observation (the empirical descriptions) as
well as second ordered observations (descriptions of social systems provided by systems theory). This
would seem to suggest the potential of moving between these orders of observations and possibly
identifying that second ordered observations can be brought back to the level of first ordered observation,
back to the empirical realm−reloaded into the initial level of observation. While an exploration of the
potential epistemological ramifications of this movement between orders of observation is beyond the
scope of this dissertation, an extended analysis of how second ordered observations inform first ordered
observations may be a fruitful expansion of the current study.
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to deal with societal complexity. Their coding enables them to make observations within
an environment too complicated to interact with in total. Yet this very reduction, the
existence of autopoietic systems, constructs further complexities. This occurs both by 1)
making communication more simple and 2) by constructing constant differentiations
within society. Self-similar communication makes the production of communications
easier since specific communicative contents are auto-recognized by the system. When
communication is produced in this manner, communication is almost guaranteed. This
allows communication to occurring more frequently and more successfully, escalating the
growth of an individual communicative systems once that system achieves autonomics.
The resulting growth of systems actually makes the communicative environment more
complex. This increase of communication actual makes the world around us less
knowable. Communicative increases produce further need for reductionary autopoietics
processes, and, thus, further contribute to society’s differentiation process as more and
more aspects of society need to employ reductionary techniques to make sense of the
communicative environment. Thus, more and more of life (from economics, to politics, to
the mass media) must systematize to make communication possible within their
communicative environments. Ironically, in modernity, the reduction of societal
complexity becomes a driving force for increasing societal complexity.
Despite the fact that society is becoming increasingly dominated in modernity by
autopoietic social systems, not all autopoietic systems are social. They are not necessarily
systems built upon communication. For example, individuals’ possess systems of
consciousness, which Luhmann calls psychic systems. I differentiate here between the
individual and the psychic system of consciousness. The fact that consciousness is, itself,
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an operationally closed system points to a specific interpretation of human beings in
systems theory. There are multiple systems within each “individual” in both Luhmann’s
(1996) and Parsons’s (1964) understanding of human beings. Rather than consisting of a
unified individual, human beings consist of two systems intertwined, or interpenetrated,
so thoroughly they appear on the surface as a single entity (who we commonly refer to as
the individual). These systems are the biological system and the human psychic system
(or personality structure for Parsons who views it as the smallest of all social systems
rather than Luhmann who views it purely as a system of consciousness). Within
Parsons’s (1964) work, the body and psychic system are seen as so separate he argues the
only interpenetrating link is pleasure and pain, the generalized medium of communication
between the biological and psychic system. In Luhmann (1996), there is no set form of
interpenetration, and interpenetration likely occurs in an infinite number of ways as the
body and psychic system communicate with one another. Nonetheless, both equally
perceive them as separate as framed within Parsons’s understanding of the human being,
but Luhmann perceives this as resulting from the process of operational closures of each
system, as described by Maturana and Varela (1980). The body only recognizes
communications within its own physical self-reproduction and the psychic system only
recognizes the replication of its own consciousness. In this study, the biological and
psychic systems are considered, as in Luhmann’s work, as two independent autopoietic
systems.
Accordingly, an individuals’ system of consciousness, like a social system,
perpetuates themselves. Psychic systems only take in information that corresponds with
previous observations the psyche has made in the past. My past experiences act as a filter,
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as a code, through which new experiences are comprehended (Luhmann, 1995; Mautrana,
1980). If new information is sufficiently self-similar (1) it becomes included in
consciousness. If not (0) it is considered environmental and will not enter consciousness.
Likewise, any system which perpetuates itself based upon its own internal processes is an
autopoietic system. In the case of social systems, they are simply autopoietic systems that
function upon communications and, therefore, make up the fabric of the social, that is the
society, which is the conglomeration of all communications.
We have now looked at autopoietic systems as closed systems and discussed some
of the ramifications of that closure. It is now necessary to complete our image of
autopoietic systems by discussing how, despite these processes of closure, social systems
are also an open system. Systemic closures are not closures effecting all potential
interactions between system and environment, but only what can or cannot be
communicated, observed, and understood within a system. Operational closure is the
closure of the self-recognized functions of the system and its interactions with its
environment. Each autopoietic system also interacts with its environment, which includes
other systems, in ways that defy its closure. This interaction is what Luhmann calls
interpenetration. An example of interpenetration is when the economy uses resources
gained from the physical environment, a biological system. They are separate systems
and interpenetration occurs between the biological system and the economy only through
the economy interpreting the other systems through value and cost, and thereby reduces
the physical environment to its own codes. The economy utilizes the physical
environment despite the fact that, as I will discuss in chapter four, the economy only
communicates in terms of money. Nonetheless, the economy is reliant on these resources
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from the physical environment as part of its own self-perpetuation even if these resources
are, technically, not a part of the economy. Another example could be the system of
politics borrowing the communication medium of money from the economy, but only to
pursue the creation and maintenance of communications of power (training armies,
building prisons, enforcing tax codes, ect...). In such cases, the interpenetration is
acknowledged and coded through the system’s self-similarity, but both systems have
ramifications extending beyond what is observable and communicable through that
coding.20
20

Within the influence of interpenetration, the interpenetration can either be acknowledged or

unacknowledged by the system. Structural coupling occurs when environmental interpenetrations occur
within the dark side, the unobservable side, of the system’s code. It is therefore an unobservable influence
for the system even though such processes are integral to the system. Just like the environment, which is
too complicated for the system to observe, the environment’s interpenetrations with the system are also
unobservable, due to the sheer manifold of those interpenetrations. Structural couplings, as noncommunicative influences, adapt a system to its environment. It constructs, in the face of differentiation, a
similitude and a concert between the system and its environment to an extent surpassing the system’s
capacity for observation. The possibility of structural coupling has interesting ramification for the
interpenetration of individuals and social structure. This is because their influence does not always need to
be acknowledged or understood by the interpenetrating system. The individuals are often influenced by
social systems in ways impossible for them to comprehend, and the structure of their consciousness are
incapable of identifying. Conversely, social structure is influenced by individuals in ways that defy their
codes and thus blinding the system to their actions. The social system and individual human beings are
always partially in shadow to one another. The fact that we have a difficult time making sense of the
complexity of the social system is not surprising considering these limitations, but we are not alone−we are
as much a mystery to the system. For Luhmann (1996) “one could say that psychic systems provide for the
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It is this quality of being a simultaneously opened and closed system that provides
the necessary precondition for a theory of agency. Despite individual’s not consisting of
communication and society not consisting of consciousness, therefore making society and
individuals separate, being opened and closed allows them to influence one another.
Since they are not internal to one another, they cannot control one another, only borrow
each other’s complexity. It is this flexibility that opens the space for agency.
Is Luhmann an Anti-Humanist?
This dissertation places itself in direct contestation with a normative identification of
Luhmann as an anti or post-humanist by purposing a reading of Luhmann that
alternatively conceptualization of individuals’ relationship to social structure. Such
interpretations of Luhmann perceive his work as attempting to remove the “human” as
both an object of analysis and fully from our understanding of society. Since autopoietic
systems are closed systems of communications, then there is an inescapable divide
between the human and the social. Therefore it is necessary, for mu proposal that systems
theory can help to understand agency, to display how such interpretations, in focusing
only on the closure of autopoietic systems, fail to recognize that, via interpenetration,
social systems are also open systems. Anti-humanistic readings of Luhmann
misrecognize the relationship between individuals and the social system and mistakenly

system disorder” (214). This adds an interesting dimension for human agency because even if our agency is
part of the communications of society, we ourselves are disorder and noise to the social system. Our agency
is as much confusion for society as its influence is for us. In regards to systems, human influence often
enters under the cover of darkness.
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claim that individuals are incapable of influencing social structure by failing to recognize
the openness of social systems and human psychic systems.
The most significant and rigorous interpretation of Luhmann as an anti-humanist
is Moeller’s (2012) The Radical Luhmann. Here Moeller comes to the conclusion that
Luhmannian systems theory is “radical anti-humanistic” through his larger interpretation
of Luhmann as a latently radical theorist who “wrote such bad books” (p. 10) to allow
himself admittance into an academia unready for his claims. According to Moeller,
Luhmann used a “Trojan horse of a largely unassuming and inaccessible language” to
“conceal certain potentially inflammatory aspects of his theory from the eyes of those
who were still too weak to look at them plainly” (p. 4). Included within Luhmann’s
unstated radicalism is his “radical anti-humanism” which “attempt[s] to fundamentally
‘de-anthropologize’ the description of society and the world in general” (p. 5).
Furthermore, according to Moeller, Luhmann’s latent anti-humanism “is not limited to a
description of reality in a nonanthropocentric way, it includes a dismissal of human
agency” (p. 5-6).
Similar to Moeller, many other authors have viewed Luhmannian theory as a form
of anti-humanism or post humanism. Such interpretations focus on Luhmann’s claims
that individuals are outside systems of communication, that “only communications can
communicate (Luhmann 2002, p. 156).” Other examples of claims that Luhmann is an
anti-humanistic thinker are the readings of Luhmann offered by Holub (1994), Bluhdorn
(2008), Luli (2014), and Bleicher (1982).
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While it is obvious Luhmann’s work displays human beings as not being the
atoms of social systems or social systems as not being composed out of human beings, in
the following section I wish to display that anti-humanistic interpretations of Luhmann
have overstated this fact. They identify the autonomy of social systems but fail to see
either the autonomy of psychic systems or the potential of interpenetration. In doing so,
anti-humanistic Luhmannians understand systems theory’s claim for the autonomy of
social systems in ways that is not congruent with the purpose of systems theory and are
directly countered in Luhmann’s own expositions on the relationship between the
individual and social systems, an exposition capable of providing a foundation for a
theory of structure and agency.
The Purpose of Systems Theory
One of the issues with an anti-humanistic interpretation of Luhmann is its incongruence
with one of the major aims of systems theory: the unification of systems analysis across
the sub-disciplines of sociology. Systems theory has always been a framework
specifically designed to deal with the divergent complexity of both sociology as a
discipline and society in general. This began with Parsons (1937; 1951), who
subsequently offered the concept of voluntary action and the AGIL system first as a
unifying concept and then a unifying framework for sociology.21 Luhmann (1996; 1998;

21

Parsons is not the first sociologist to use the concept of the social system or systems theory. Previous

sociologists, most notably L. J. Henderson (1970), whose sociological work was only published
posthumously after Parsons, presaged Parsons in regard to systems theory and influence on systems theory.
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2000; 2012; 2013), similarly, attempts to unite sociology by offering the autopoietic form
so that all social systems can be analyzed in a like manner. Here Luhmann argues that all
social systems, as systems of communication, are constructed out their own internal selfreferencing. This similarity in form replicated across social systems allows sociologists
from divergent substantive focuses to be united through sharing a similar type of analysis
which Luhmann refers to as second ordered observation, which examines how specific
communications and observations are included or excluded. This unification of
sociological discourse via autopoietic form can be seen most clearly in the variety of
Luhmann’s work on specific social systems which includes, but is not limited to,
economics (1988), politics (1990), science (1990), the mass media (2000), art (2000), law
(2004), and religion (2013).22
If systems theory in general, and Luhmannian systems theory specifically, is
understood as a framework that deals with diverse foci within sociology and seeks to
construct a unified analysis from these foci, then understanding Luhmann’s theory as a
form of anti-humanism appears antithetical to what Luhmann generally is trying to
accomplish in his systems analysis and specifically to what he claims concerning the
Nonetheless, Parsons is the first to utilize systems theory as a unifying framework for sociology and is the
founder of the systems tradition as it is normally utilized in sociology.
22

Beyond the unification of sociology, systems theory also aspires to create concreate intersections with

other disciplines through the extension of this unified analysis. L.J. Henderson (1970) attempted this
interconnection with medicine; Talcott Parsons (1937; 1956; 1964) with economics, psychology, and
anthropology; Anne Parsons (1969) with psychology and anthropology; Luhmann (1995; 2012; 2013) with
biology, mechanics, cybernetics, engineering, and psychology.

85

relationship between human beings and social systems. His overall project tries to
accomplish, if we view Luhmann as a continuation of Parsons’ goal, unifying sociology
under a single research program capable of encompassing sociology as a whole. So, then,
if all sociology involving “agency” are removed from this project, it would certainly be
antithetical to this goal.
Neo-functionalists such as Alexander (1998) and Mouzelis (2008), in regards to
Parsons, make congruent claims against labeling systems theory as either a “structural” or
an “agent driven” approach to social theorizing. According to neo-functionalists,
sociology had already, in Parsonian theory, constructed an analysis which attempted to
move beyond oppositional views between individuals and social structure, that is between
the structural determination of human action and the determination of human behavior on
social structure. Alexander and Mouzelis argue that systems theory attempted to
incorporate both the structural and the agented, as well as the micro and the macro, in
Parsons’ early work on voluntary action. Here Parsons attempts to reduce tension
between human choice and social structures’ influence by displaying the co-evolution of
individual psychology and the social systems those individuals occupy.23 This desire to
construct an analysis that includes both human choice and structural influence extends
into Parsons’ later work and can be seen in his mapping of the relationship between
social, cultural, and personality systems.

23

For Parsons, unlike Luhmann, human beings are within systems.
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These attempts to bridge human decision, or volition, and structural
determination lead neo-functionalists to claim that Parsons “solved” the structure/agency
debate by rendering contemporary discussions of the debate pointless before it was ever
conceived. Beyond the specifics of the somewhat Ptolemaic bridging of structure and
agency claimed by neo-functionalists, there is a point to be made about the desire for a
unified sociological theoretical framework and an either/or approach to existing
sociological dichotomies that extend to Luhmann as well.24 Luhmann cannot be
simultaneously anti-humanistic and provide a unified analysis for sociology, because this
would exclude any agent driven approaches to sociology from the unified sociological
analysis. The next section displays the dichotomy of humanism/anti-humanism is, in fact,
too simplistic to capture the nuance of what Luhmann triend to accomplish. Rather,
Luhmann’s analysis, just as his desire to unify sociology, is a Janis mask revealing both
“humanistic” and as “anti-humanistic” elements. So, by failing to see the overall goal of
systems theory, anti-humanistic interpretations reduce Luhmann’s analysis of the
complex interactions between individuals and social systems to only those elements
predicted by one half of their binary. 25
24

I say “Ptolemaic” since neo-functionalist claims that Parsons solved the structure/agency debate seem

odd in light of the fact that Parson’s “solution” predates the debate itself.
25

Adding some irony to this interpretation is that this implementation of the normative distinction of anti-

humanism to Luhmann’s theory produces the exact result that Luhmann’s theory would predict. For
Luhmann (1995), normative distinctions, being themselves a part of society, are systemic. That is they
utilize codes to exclude information to their environment. By interpreting Luhmann’s theory through a code
of humanism/anti-humanism, the code reduces Luhmann’s theory to only the communications significantly
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Luhmann’s Model of The Interaction of the Individual and Social Structure
I have already claimed that beyond the overall goal of systems theory and Luhmann’s
place within it, Luhmann’s model of the actual relationship between human beings and
social systems is itself also obscured by Moeller and other Luhmannian anti-humanists.
But what is the relationship they are obscuring? What is being missed? The central
misrecognition is that anti-humanist readings of systems theory fail to identify that for
Luhmann, human beings have a specific relationship to social systems even if they are
not “within” systems. It is a relationship that grows as much out of autonomy and
individuality of human beings as it does out of the autonomy and individuality of social
systems.
This relationship is probably most clearly outlined in Luhmann’s (2002) article
entitled “What is Communications?” which outlines the difference between systems of
consciousness, (which Luhmann calls psychic systems) belonging to human beings, and
systems of communication (which Luhmann calls social systems).26 Both are autopoietic,

self-similar to whatever side of the normative distinction is being applied. In this case, Luhmann can be
read as an “anti-humanist” only by filtering Luhmann’s claims through a normative distinction. In this way,
what Moeller and others are actually practicing is systemic and a first ordered observation in their reading
of Luhmann.

26

Systems theory identifies multiple systems within each “individual,” and the individual as a multiplicity

of systems can be seen in Luhmann’s (1996) and Parsons’ (1964) understandings of human beings. Rather
than consisting of a unified individual, human beings consist of two systems intertwined, or interpenetrated,
so thoroughly that they appear on the surface as a single entity (commonly referred to as the individual).
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and, in the case of social systems, this autopoiesis is constructed out of the self-referential
loop of communications where previous communications structure future
communications. For psychic systems, autopoiesis is based upon consciousness. This
consciousness consist of human beings thinking through a self-referential loop in which
previous experiences and actions are the filters through which future information will be
understood and future actions will be decided. In this way, for Luhmann, human psychic
systems exist side by side, both possessing their own autopoietically closed loop.
Individuals, therefore, exist in Luhmann’s model, but exist in a sort of mutual
externalized independence from social system. Both are determined by their own internal
structure. In this way, individual’s independence from social systems mirrors systems
independence from individuals.
While this may be sufficient to conclude that Luhmann is not an “anti-humanist,”
in a more careful review of this article, we see something even more curious which
These systems are the biological system and the human psychic system (or personality structure for
Parsons). Within Parsons’ (1964) work, the body and psychic system are so separate that he argues they
only interpenetrate in pleasure and pain, the generalized medium of communication between the biological
and psychic system. Luhmann (1996), prescribes no set form of interpenetration and it likely occurs in an
infinite number of possible ways as the body and psychic system communicate with one another.
Nonetheless, they are equally perceived as separate as within Parsons’s understanding of the human being,
but for Luhmann this is the result of the process of operational closures of each system, following Maturana
and Varela (1980), with the body only recognizing communications within its own physical selfreproduction and the psychic system only recognizing the replication of its own consciousness. In this
study, the biological and psychic systems are considered, as in Luhmann’s work, as two independent
autopoietic systems.
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highlights the novelty of what Luhmann says regarding individuals’ relationship to social
structure. Throughout “What is Communication?” there exist side by side, claims which
appear to express the individuals’ limited ability to act as “agents” as well as claims
which seem to indicate human beings independence from, and ability to influence, social
systems. For example Luhmann claims “only communications communicate (p. 156)”
indicating that, within social systems, individuals, as systems of consciousness, do not
communicate. That “a social system cannot think [and] a psychic system cannot
communicate (p. 165);” “consciousness can contribute only noise, interference, and
disturbance to a social system (p. 165);” and “consciousness, no matter what it itself
thinks to itself, is maneuvered by communication into a situation of forced choice (p.
167).” All of these statements suggest that there is a lack of control and of the possibility
of agency, on the part of the individual. Yet, within the same article, Luhmann also
claims, “if we were to make an effort to really observe our consciousness…we would
see…the non-communicative, purely internal use of symbols and background depth of
the actuality of conciseness” which describes “the superiority of consciousness over
communication (p. 166).” Social systems which “cannot think (p. 165)” clearly indicate,
for Luhmann, that individuals cannot be made subservient to social systems even those of
language. Nonetheless, individuals also “can bring into communication their own
perceptions and interpretation (p. 158);” they possess “causal relations (p. 165)” with
social systems.
We see similar juxtapositions of human capacities and limitations in Social
System, the text where Luhmann (1996) most deeply and broadly outlines his general
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systems theory. Here Luhmann unabashedly asserts that “social systems are not
composed of psychic systems, let alone of bodily human beings. Therefore, psychic
systems belong to the environment of social systems” (p. 254).
Nonetheless, he clarifies by also claiming:
They are part of the environment that is especially relevant for the
formation of social systems…Such environment relevance for the
construction of social systems constrains what is possible, but it does not
prevent social systems from forming themselves autonomously on the
basis of their own elemental operations. (p. 254)
Conversely, even though Luhmann explains the mutual importance of individuals and
social systems because “psychic systems and social systems come into being in the
course of co-evolution,” he qualifies this statement by pointing out that:
Autopoietic difference is also important: in the self-referential closure of
their reproduction psychic and social systems cannot be reduced to each
other. They use different media of reproduction: consciousness and
communication…no autopoietic super system could integrate both into a
unity: no consciousness revolves around communication and no
communication around consciousness. (p. 271)
The trick to understanding this curiosity within Luhmann’s work is not to focus
on how individuals and social systems constrain each other. This potential exists for
Luhmann through the interpenetration of social and psychic systems but is of secondary
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importance. Luhmann, instead, invites us to focus on the way both are limited by their
own internal structure. 27 Both are closed systems that can only relate to the external
world through themselves: social systems are closed systems of communication; psychic
systems are closed systems of consciousness. Each can affect the other, but they are more
limited by their own closure than they are by this mutual influence. In other words,
Luhmann (2002) is concurrently “humanistic” and “anti-humanistic.” “The systems are
opaque to each other and can therefore not steer each other (p. 165).” They can influence
each other but are not capable of actual domination and control. Human beings are
“humanistic” in their independence from system, in the independence of their
consciousness outside of communication, and in their ability to think and act upon their
own internal self-referential consciousness which the system neither understands nor
accesses. But human beings have similar lack of control over the social systems
surrounding them.28

27

In Social System Luhmann (1996) states: “How can communication play a part in the autopoietic

reproduction of consciousness … interpenetration. The social system places its own complexity, which has
stood the test of communicative manageability, at the psychic systems disposal” (p.272).

28

It is interesting to note, while Luhmann argues it is part of the basic structure of society that human

beings are environmental to society, he does not use this to construct a transhistorical notion of the
individual. In Theory of Society Luhmann (2012) explains that while “the singularity of the body and
consciousness of each human being and the operational closure of the corresponding autopoiesis is a selfevident presupposed in all variations of societal history,” it is “only in modern times that being an
individual came to be institutionalized in a way that expected individuals to behave accordingly” (p. 254),
and “the reason the modern age favors the individual is that individuals are conceived as persons, and in
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So far we have seen how Luhmann views both individuals and social systems as
autonomous. This autonomy creates for both a greater degree of control over themselves
than if individuals are posited as being within the system. It makes the autonomy as much
an intellectual emancipation for individuals as it is for social systems. This is not only in
direct opposition to the existing interpretations of Luhmann put forth by anti-humanists.
Yet is in this opposition, by positing, that human beings are autonomous from social
structure, we can think about agency not in terms of fissioning ourselves from social
structure, in getting “outside” of the influence of society, but in terms of understanding
the barriers to agency. Agency, rather than becoming an impossibility, becomes
dependent upon the individuals’ ability to cross the divide of autonomy. We will now
discuss interpenetration as crossing this divide, thus completing a Luhmannian theory of
agency.
Systems Theory and Agency
In the introduction I claimed that there was a latent theory of agency in Luhmann’s
theory of the interaction between individuals and social systems. Now that we have
established the mutual autonomy of individuals and social systems, it is now possibly to
display how this, in the context of Luhmann’s overall theory leads to a theory of agency.
It is because mutual autonomy, the differentiation of social and psychic systems, is not a
complete separation. Being simultaneously opened and closed systems, enables them to

this form they can symbolize the unknowness of the future. On can know persons, but cannot know how
they will act” (p. 265).
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influence one another despite their differentiation. Central to this is the interpenetration
of systems.
It is in interpenetration that−moment of mutual influence between psychic and
social systems−that allows this divide to be crossed. But the moment occurs
simultaneously for both social and psychic systems. The moment when human beings
“bring into communication their own perceptions and interpretation” (p. 158) is
simultaneously the moment when the system “thematizes persons” (p. 165). The moment
when human beings exert influence over the system is the moment when the system
exerts influence over them−a phenomenon I refer to as the psychic confluence with social
systems. Psychic confluence is similar to how Luhmann (1996) describes
interpenetration. “We speak of penetration if a system makes its own complexity
available for constructing another system…interpenetration only exist when this occurs
reciprocally, that is when both systems enable each other by introducing their own
already constructed complexity into each other” (p. 213). The inter of interpenetration
signifies this very relationship, when influence only occurs mutually. Resulting from this
psychic confluence, the moment of structure or agency is the same rather than separate.
This is why it is called interpenetration. Systems, in the moment that they utilize one
another intermix and in unison structure communications.29 In like manner, human beings
29

It should be noted that, for Luhmann, consciousness is not some automatic external phenomenon

preexistent from society itself, like Archer’s (2001; 2003) embodies self. Luhmann’s consciousness is a
co-existent phenomenon similar in its structuring to a social system and emerges from its own complexity.
It then becomes dependent upon its own internal structure to determine itself, just as with individual social
systems which, as a result of increasing complexity, develop into their own self-referential system. Similar
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and social systems utilize one another in their self-perpetuation. In Social Systems, when
Luhmann (1996) for the first time introduces the concept of interpenetration, he does so
through a discussion of the interpenetration of human beings and social systems. He
offers it as an alternative to the “humanistic tradition where human beings stand within
order, as an element of society itself.” (p. 211). But, within the interpenetration of human
beings and psychic systems:
The distinction between system and environment offers the possibility of
conceiving human beings as parts of the societal environment in a way
that is both more complex and less restricting than if they had to be
interpenetrated as parts of society, because in comparison with the system,

to social systems, the complexity of surrounding systems surrounding psychic systems, which will later
become as the psychic systems environment, often serves as a catalyst for new autopoietic systems to
develop becoming self-referential to deal with the complexity of their environment. So social systems (as
well as biological, ecological, and other systems) and their complexity might serve as the impetus for the
emergence of consciousness. Since the autopoietics of consciousness is not built on its externality, but
occurs as a result of its complexity, it develops its own trajectory influenced by, but also partially
independent from, the trajectory developed by social systems out of the complexity of their
communications. Nonetheless, once this autopoietics begins, consciousness externalizes itself from its
environment. Therefore, this environmental nature of consciousness and its quasi-independence from social
systems is not a function of some sort of trans-historical assumed externality. It is not an “always been” nor
is it necessary to prove that consciousness predates societal influence. Instead, the co-existence of social
systems, whose complexity leads them to develop the ability to pursue their trajectory of self-replication,
and psychic systems, who individually pursue their trajectory of self-replication, can simultaneously exist
without contradiction.
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the environment is the domain of distinction that shows the greatest
complexity and less existing order. The human being is thus conceded
greater freedom in relations to his environment…he is no longer the
measure of society. (p. 212)
Thus, the relationship of human beings to social systems is one of influence, that is why it
is still appropriate to discuss agency. Bu if individuals influence the system then they are
taking part in structured communication; anything else means being relegated to the
environment. It is the combination of this autonomy and interpenetrating influence that
provides Luhmann’s latent theory of agency with its defining characteristics.
Conclusion: Luhmann as a Model of Structure and Agency

We have now seen that systems theory can be thought of as an alternative way of
theorizing the relationship between social structure and the individual, in which, like we
have seen for Giddens, Archer, and Bhaskar, both the individual and the social structure
maintain the ability to influence one another but also can be seen as independent forces
from one another. Nonetheless Luhmann’s solution has different ramifications though.
This is because the moment when the individual and social structure influence one
another is not seen as separate, or the causality of the agent and that of structure can be
cleanly differentiated and labeled. Instead, any time individuals communicate, act or
speak within systems, it represents both agency and structure simultaneously: agency to
the degree that the communication is a reflection of the individual’s consciousness,
structure to the degree that the communication is communication. This results in a
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different interpretation in regards to how individuals interact with social structure. In the
subsequent chapter I illustrate this difference by offering a system theoretical
interpretation of flash mobs which differs significantly from both the existing literature
and the interpretation of flash mobs offered in the structure and agency chapter.
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CHAPTER 4: SYSTEMS THEORETICAL INTERPRETATIONS OF FLASH MOBS
In this chapter I offer two system theoretical readings of flash mobs. The first seeks to
explain flash mobs from the point of view of various social systems. It begins with a brief
description of these systems as they are described in Luhmann’s theory and then offers
how flash mob communications are utilized by that specific system. Here we, in essence,
see systems theory as it is normally presented by Luhmann−a framework for
understanding systemic communications. This reading will display how flash mobs are a
part of “social structure.” Additionally, we will discuss the possibility of other, less easily
identifiable systems that have influence over flash mobs, as well as discuss how, at least
in one instance, we can see a flash mob as constructing its own form of self-replication.
Once the flash mob is described from the point of view of the social system, the chapter
will then describe how systems of consciousness−human psychic systems−interact with
flash mobs. This explanation will likewise be system theoretical and display a
Luhmannian understanding of consciousness. In this we will examine how human beings
seek to communicate their own consciousness through flash mobs. This analysis displays
how communications represent the “agency” of the individual. While Luhmann offered
several detailed descriptions of social systems, many of which include empirical
descriptions, Luhmann offers no such descriptions of consciousness. Thus, this chapter
attempts to extend Luhmann’s systems theory, flushing out his theory of consciousness
by imputing it into an analysis of a single communication which simultaneously
communicates multiple social systems as well as being influenced by expressions of
human consciousness. Thus, in this second reading we will offer a demonstration of the
psychic confluence discussed in the previous chapter.
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A Luhmannian Reading of Flash Mobs
In this section I will analyze several social systems for which Luhmann has offered a
model and how we can see the influence of these social systems in flash mob
communications. Such systems range in scope from large macro-institutional systems
easily identified by the reader (such as economics or politics) to the potential of smaller
social systems for which no immediate identification is available (such as interpersonal
relationships between individual people). Likewise, the influence of these systems differs
in their proximity to the flash mob which ranges from systems that flash mobs
communicate directly (art) to systems that only influence flash mobs after
interpenetrating with its non-flash mob environment (economics). Such communicative
distance does not indicate the amount of influence. For example, we will see that the
economy affects flash mobs in very visible way despite not being able to interpenetrate as
directly as other institutions due the medium through which it communicates. The below
examples are meant neither to be a catalogue of systems that influence flash mobs, nor a
representative sample of institutions, nor a description of the most influential systems, but
simply an identification of systems that can be readily recognized in the flash mobs
described previously in this dissertation.
Flash Mobs Communicating as Art
The most natural starting point for discussing flash mobs through systems theory is to
discuss the flash mob as a work of art embedded in art as a social system. Central to
understanding the social system of art for Luhmann (2000) is understanding how art
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alters the perception of the observer by constructing what Luhmann calls Anschauung30, a
term introduced by Luhmann to signify the self-induced, purposive perception
constructed by art. It is in Anschauung that “art aims to retard perception and render it
reflexive−lingering upon the object of visual art” (p. 14). Furthermore, it is through this
Anschauung that artistic communication gains both its unique qualities as a social system
as well as its ability to differentiate itself from its environment, which allows art to
construct itself as an autonomous system. This is because it is “only in the form of
Anschauung that art acquires the possibility of constructing imaginary worlds within the
life-world” (p.7). By constructing self-induced purposive perceptions, art opens fictitious
worlds that define themselves in opposition to the world outside of themselves. These
fictitious worlds become an “unmarked space… which, rather than having a specific
opposite, are demarcated against ‘everything else.’ Forms whose other side remains
undetermined” (p.46).
Before moving into the direct application of Luhmann’s theory of art to the flash
mob, I would like to examine of how the theory works in its most “stripped down” form.
We can see this in the monochrome works of Ives Klein’s canvases painted in solid color
(blue, green, red, gold, orange, white). The overarching theme of Klein’s work, both
monochrome and otherwise, is what he called the void. Klein wished to explore the space

30

In Knodt’s translation of Art as a Social System the term Anschauung is translated intuition (p. 14). Here

I have left the original German verb to avoid confusion. Luhmann appears, from the surrounding context, to
be utilizing some of the subtler meanings of the verb (which also means to view, opine, contemplate),
which intuition does not capture.
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Figure 18 Monochrome Blanc Sans Titre (M 45), 1957 and Monochrome Rouge Sans Titre (M 38), 1955.

of the void in his work and encourage others to follow him into the void, a zone of
“nothingness and everything, where there are no names, rules, boundaries, or definitions”
(Stich, p. 13). By offering a solid colored canvas, Klein hoped his audience would “be
released from some indefinable, horrible cage,” present in most art; Klein claimed that “a
usual painting […] is for me like a window of a prison whose lines, contours, forms,
composition create barriers […] they are our psychological limits, our heredity, our
education, our skeleton, our vices, our aspirations, our qualities, our astuteness! (Stich,
67)”. Klein’s void displays, in an extreme manner, Luhmann’s Anschauung. That, even
without offering a specific “content,” which Klein would consider as trapping the
audience, he nonetheless opens a space, a separate world from the environment, a free an
unbounded space, an open world. In this way, when we purposefully apply our attention
to Klein’s painting, that is when the painting draws our attention to itself, it is capable of
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Figure 19 Enthusiastic Audience Member Touching Frozen Participant (Retrieved from
www.improveeverywhere.com 3/10/15)

opening the world of the void because it out-differentiates, it distinguishes itself, from the
world outside the canvas−the paintings environment.
The sudden amassing of people, like the boundary of a canvas, differentiates itself
from its external environment. As we saw in the example of Wasik’s flash mobs, great
care is taken to synchronize the event to construct the differentiation, including
synchronizing watches and handing out sheets with precise instructions and times (Wasik
2009). Such alterations of time and space are central to Luhmann’s understanding of art.
Constructing “unmarked spaces” for art also means the out-differentiation of its own
special and temporal location, as Luhmann (2000) noted: “constitution of special and
temporal horizons and the erasure of information concerning its own spatial temporal
location” (p.7). This syncretizing, and the shock it creates in the audience, involves
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exactly this kind of erasure. An example of this is Improv Everwhere’s “Frozen Grand
Central Station” flash mob, where, as the name would indicate, participants stood
completely still for exactly 5 minutes in New York’s busy Grand Central Station (Muse
2010). The transformation occurred in such a way that the space transformed into
something other. Train terminals are movement and by staying still the participants
demarcated and separated their performance from the special location. Likewise, their
stillness slowed time as an otherwise busy audience, who under other circumstances
would have rushed to their destination, stopped, watched, took pictures, pointed, laughed,
and touched frozen performers. The routines of time and space were disrupted and
replaced by a void-esque space. The impact on the audience of such alterations with time
and space becomes obvious. It draws their attention, their Anschauung. What would have
been, without the flash mob, a routine interaction of space, time, and the individuals, and
which would have consisted of the filtering and haphazard attention of everyday life, was
broken. Instead, the artwork created a space by concentrating and absorbing the audience
member’s attention into a self-induced purposive perception in which the world outside
of itself, the special and temporal considerations of the audience, is suspended. In its
procurement of public space in short durations of time by the use of mass participation,
the flash mob becomes a monochrome painted in human presence.
Flash Mobs Communicating as the Mass Media, Politics, and Economics
If we are to identify the flash mob as a communication belonging to the system of art,
how then are we to understand the flash mob as a communication of the various other
systems surrounding it, especially when we consider that these systems are all
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operationally closed, self-regulating systems? In other words, if the communication of the
flash mob constructs an exclusive world exiling everything outside of itself, how is it that
we can talk as we did at the beginning of this study of marketing, political, or charitable
flash mobs? We can find an explanation in our discussion of interpenetration, in which a
social system borrows the complexity of another social system to achieve its own
communication. Just as a police officer may utilize language−itself a social system−to
write a parking ticket (a communication of political power), other social systems can
utilize the artistic communication of the flash mob for its own ends. In other words, other
systems utilize the flash mob’s ability to construct Anschauung for their own purposes,
communicating content very different from the system of art itself.
Probably the social system most closely interpenetrated with flash mob
communications of the system of art is the mass media. This is because the mass media is
central to the communication of flash mobs. According to Luhmann (2000), the mass
media constructs a dynamic self-referencing flow of information and therefore forms
reality in the midst of chaotic and highly differentiated interactions typifying modernity.
Through the need of “being up-to-date on one’s information,” and “being up to date on
one’s culture…the mass media has generated a background reality which can be taken as
a starting point, one can take off from there and create a profile for oneself by expressing
personal opinions, saying how they see the future, demonstrating preferences, ect…” (p.
65). This reality is not reality in the sense of corresponding to some external reality, to
things-in-and-of-themselves, yet “can speak of the reality of the mass media in the sense
of what appears in them, or through them to others…that is reality” (p. 4).
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Within the reality of the mass media what matters is the constant flow of
information. This information could be news, which, on the surface, projects itself as
“corresponding” to reality, or could be “information” provided in television shows or
films, which attempts no such correspondence. The mass media does not try, within the
flow of information, to construct a “shared” reality in the sense of Durkheim’s totem−an
agreed upon reality void of difference. The mass media neither works at “increasing
knowledge nor in socializing nor educating people in conformity with norms” (p. 98).
Contrary to a Durkheimian shared reality, a reality of a mechanical solidarity, the reality
of the mass media:
Does not seem to be aiming to generate a consensual construction of
reality…Their world contains and reproduces differences …this does not
only happen when conflicts are being reported, when suspicions of
manipulation come to the fore or when purely private views of reality are
presented ‘live.’ The mass media is always working continuously at
discrediting themselves. They comment, they dispute, they correct
themselves. (p. 68)
In other word, the mass media is a “background reality,” a way of allowing for an easy
communicative flow capable of functioning in a state of pure difference.
Nearly all flash mob communication is thoroughly interpenetrated with the
communication of mass media. It is the mass media that takes the moment of
Anschauung, trapped in the physical moment of execution, and spreads it by
reconstructing it as a mass phenomenon. No doubt this interpenetration was part of the
initial intention of the flash mob. After all, as we saw above, Wasik created the flash mob
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as a commentary on the explosive and transitory nature of internet communication.
Nonetheless, the manner that mass media and art reciprocally borrow on each other gives
the flash mob its specific character. The mass media communication becomes focused.
Attention is drawn. At the same time the flash mob, as an artistic expression, takes on the
character of the mass media. According to Luhmann, the mass media’s “preference is for
information, which loses its surprise value through publication, that is, is constantly
transformed into non-information” (p. 98). In short, by interpenetrating with the mass
media, the artistic communications of the flash mob are simultaneously spread and
incorporated into the background reality constructed by the mass media, a reality as
fleeting and transitory as the flash mob’s bracketing of space and time itself.
Nonetheless, just as the mass media can interpenetrate with the artistic
communication of the flash mobs, we see through the short history of flash mobs
interpenetrations in which other social systems utilize the Anschauung of the flash mob in
for their own communication. One system that can be identified in our discussion of flash
mobs is the system of politics. According to Luhmann (1990), the system of politics has
its origin in the subsequent centralization and democratization of the state, which results
in “making the relations of power reflexive, trough making all political power recursively
subordinate to power” (p. 125) and making “a significant semantic increase of the
political medium of power possible” (p. 123). In other words, the system of politics
represents the increase and continuation of communications of power. By power
Luhmann means “a social relation in which action could have always been different on
both sides of the relation…whoever is subject to power experiences it and submits to it
only if one sees and would prefer other possibilities of action for himself” (p.153). That
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“the person who has power and for the person who is subordinate to it the relation must
be defined that both could act otherwise” (p. 156). Luhmann considers power not so
much as an “exercising” of power or force but as something defined in opposition to
other actions power is the absence of another act, it is a suppression of actions which may
have been committed in its absence.
Central to this theory of power in Luhmann’s work is that communications have
the potential to employ negative sanctions to control individual’s actions. Such sanctions
communicate power so long as they maintain the potential to exist whether or not
sanctions are implemented. That, “to characterize this symbolically generalized medium
of communication (i.e. power) the concept of the negative sanction…is an alternative
which, in the normal case on which power is based, both sides would prefer to avoid
rather than actualize” (p. 157). It follows that “power then results from the fact that the
person who has it is more likely to withstand the exercise of negative sanction than the
person who is subordinate to it. Precisely because it is not used and as long as it is not
used the possibility of imposing negative sanction is a source of power. Power, therefore,
comes to an end if it exercises the possibility of force. The exercise of physical violence
is not an application of power but an expression of its failure- or at least a presentation of
the considered possibility of being able to apply sanctions repeatedly” (p. 158).
The centralization and democratization of the state in modernity make the
communication of power recursive because communications of power by the political
system and oppositions to those communications become institutionalized into a “conflict
that is played out as in a compulsory ritual” (p. 184) in which “the schema of
acceptance/rejection becomes sovereign and can be practiced in all directions” (p.175).
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Within democracy’s power a semantic opposition is practiced where political actors
engage in ritualized communications involving the rejection and acceptance of specific
actions by the government. Such actions communicate power, they are actions where
actors “could act otherwise” (p. 153), actions that would have been executed differently
by political opponents. These ritualized communications result, as Luhmann explains, in
political conflicts that enter into a constant communication in which each communication
of power is responded to by an oppositional communication:
The system reproduces itself through events that it itself produces. There
is no other basis for its existence. Everything else is environment. The real
“system compulsion” resides in the fact that every event always has to be
followed by another, thus every communication is always by another. So,
reproduction is not replication, and the continuation of communication
cannot reside in the fact that one repeats what was said. One has to ask
something to it or, what is simpler, something against it. This is the reason
we say the system prefers conflict as a mode of communication and the
model of government/opposition reproducers the position necessary for
this. Every utterance can be assigned to two sides. And the other side
knows that the code requires it to say something. (p. 184)
It is, thus, through the internalization of the conflicts surrounding the communication of
power as a part of the state’s governance, centralizing and democratizing, that politics as
an autopoietic system of communication forms, and it is in the exercising of “democracy”
that modern systems of power have their continuation.
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In our examples of political flash mobs, the semantics of power described by
Luhmann is displayed. This is particularly true of Latarro’s Arts=Ammo flash mob. Here
we, once again, see the interpenetration of a political and artistic communication. The
flash mob seeks to communicate politically. Within a democratic, centralized, selfreferencing system of politics, Latarro’s communication of a pro-gun control political
project represents an automatic response, attempting to speak the “always could have
been otherwise” of politics within the internalized conflict of politics. In other words, the
flash mob communicates in opposition to an existing gun-control policy, a response
predicated on these existing policies, and, within a democracy, an automatic response
within the binary political conversation in which both sides of an opposition exist within
the same governmental system. But, to draw attention to this political communication, to
make the political communication a successful communication and one capable of being
heard by its audience, it borrows on the attention generating Anschauung of the flash
mob. It likewise borrows on the mass audience generated by the interpenetrations of the
flash mob and the mass media. One can readily understand other flash mob
communications (such as the Occupy flash mob protesting the Ferguson shootings or the
Fried Squirrels flash mob protesting Canadian anti-worker legislation) as
communications within the binary system of politics, and thus within internalized
conflicts of the autopoietic system of politics, interpenetrating with the social systems of
art and the mass media via flash mobs to broadcast their communications more broadly.
Similar observations can be made concerning the interpenetration of the economy
and systems of art in flash mob expressions. In Die Wirtschaft Der Geshellchaft,
Luhmann (1988) argues that the history of economic theory is typified by a
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misidentification of the primary element of economics.31 In classical economics, when
questions of the central cause of value were discussed, labor increasingly became
identified as the origin of all value. “All operated with labor behind it. The division of
labor was the “wonder” of the effective increase, and to enable the division of labor,
money was not necessary” (p 44). This focus on labor permanently tied together the
maximization of production and value for economics and thus, “the theories of the
economy became…couched as a theory of economic production” (p. 44). Despite the fact
that, beginning with the marginalist revolution in economics, the labor theory of value
was abandoned, the economic focus on production persisted for both economics itself and
the sociology of the economy. This focus, according to Luhmann, obscures the central
factor for understanding the modern-autopoietic economy, which is, in its core, a system
which communicates in the generalized medium of money. That, in economics, while
“money became celebrated, naturally, as an inseparable requirement of the market
economy and achievement of civilization; it occupied in the theories a non-prominent
place” (p. 45).
The centrality of money as the medium through which the economy has extended
consequences for the economy, as Luhmann (1990) explains in Social Systems:
“The modern economic system has its unity in money. It is money through
and through. This means that all operations that are economically relevant
and only operations that are economically relevant, refer to money” (p.
461)

31

Note that all quotations from this sections a self-translated from German to English
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For Luhmann the economy only communicates through money. It is only when currency
is changing hand, when value is being communicated, that the economy is
communicating. This is the autopoietics of the economy: when money communicates, it
does so in a way that structures further communication, and “payments are nothing more
than the enabling of further payments” (p. 461). It is this exchanging of capital, and this
exchange alone, through which the economic system grows and maintains itself.
Reflecting further on the novelty of what Luhmann is saying here may be
warranted, and how different it is from our intuitive understanding. This means that many
of the features we assume to be a part of the economy are actually the environment of the
economy. For instance, if we are to understand the economy in a Luhmannian way, what
we would normally deem “economic actors,” institutions such as corporations or
financial institutions, are not actually, or at least not always, a part of the economy. That
is not to say that they do not affect or interact with the economic system but, technically
speaking, most of their actions are not economic. It is only their direct monetary
transactions that are part of the economic system.
A comparison between Luhmann and Parsons’ (1956; 2007) discussions of
economy may help shed light on how this “affecting” of the economy but not form
“within” the economy of corporations, or business structures in general, occurs. Within
Parson’s AGIL system each social system has to fulfill the same functions as the overall
society. This means that the economy must have a political system, that the political
system must have an economy, ect… In this way, just as in Luhmann’s discussion of
interpenetration, Parsons’ social systems invade one another; institutions we intuitively
identify with the economy, like corporations, may actually be the political system since
111

they fulfill a political function, even if it is “part” of the economy. Within Parsons’ AGIL
framework, social systems, rather than clearly bounded from one another, are what I like
to call wormholed into one another.
Drawn graphically the process looks like this for Parsons (Figure 19). In step 1
each society has a set functions to survive. In step 2, despite this, every institution
fulfilling a function (such as the economy which Parsons sees as fulfilling the adaptation
functions of society) in turn has to internally fulfill the other functions. This means that
within the economy there is a hidden political system, which Parsons identifies as being
fulfilled, partially, by corporations in the modern economy. In step 3, just like the society
itself and the economy itself, the corporation would likewise have to fulfill all four of the
functions. Thus, we could discuss corporation’s having a culture (latent pattern
maintenance), even though the corporation is actually a form of government (goal
attainment) embedded within the economy (adaptation). This is why I described this as
being a wormhole in Parsons. Every system worms and weaves its way through the other
social systems surrounding it, which is an essential part of the continued existence of
each of the systems.
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Figure 20 The Wormhole-ing of Social Systems in Parsons

I am pointing out this interaction between institutions in the Parsons’ AGIL
system is not to claim that Luhmann holds to this system in any way, especially in terms
of societal “functions” being fulfilled by set institutions. But, Luhmann’s analysis does
have a similarity in the way in which systems interact with one another, due to the
various interpenetrations between systems. Systems, in using one another, defy our
intuitive boundaries since, in borrowing one another’s communications, they cocommunicate while interpenetrating.
As we have seen, Luhmann’s economy is reliant on its environment for anything
other than the exchange of the generalized medium of money. This means, for its
continued existence, the economy must interpenetrate of other social systems that
communicate differently. This also means the systems would, just as in Parsons,
wormhole their way into one another, which we will see in the relationship between the
economy and the flash mob as a communication of the social system of art.
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In each of the social systems being analyzed note that we see an increasing
number of interpenetrations and an increasing number of separate systems
communicating simultaneously and borrowing on each other’s complexity. In this way,
the interpenetration of the systems of art and mass media are not necessarily separable
from the system of art’s interpenetration with the political or economic system. This does
not mean that all social systems must be present in all communications; each system only
communicates within interpenetrations that are useful for their continuation through their
own internal processes. Nonetheless, our analysis of various systems communicating
through flash mobs illustrates both that the interactions between social systems can be
traced to a fair amount of complexity by analyzing how various systems can be seen as
affecting a specific communication, while simultaneously speaking to complex
interaction of various social systems within that communication and why any
identification of communication as belonging to only a specific system destroys the
complex realities of the interaction between systems.
To understand how these institutions interact with the economy, as well as the
economy’s influence on the flash mob, we must consider how the economy
interpenetrates with its environment. For Luhmann “a fully monetized economy is an
excellent example of a system that is simultaneously open and closed. The
interconnection of the conditions for closure and openness brings about the
differentiation of the economy because of the unavoidable coupling of self and other
reference” (p. 462). That “the economy’s operation ultimately refers to the environment:
to things, activities, and needs” (p. 462). Despite the economy only consisting of the
communication of money, the narrow specialization of the communication makes the
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economy particularly dependent upon other institutions for its continuation and
maintenance. This has made the economy an institution specializing in interpenetration
by utilizing part of its environment. Put into non-Luhmannian language, the economy has
a tendency to economize other communications more so than other social systems, and
make non-moneyed communications perform the necessary work to ensure that money is
always communicated so the exchange of money becomes central to other
communications.
It is through the influence of this openness we see the effect of the economic
system on flash mobs in what we could term monetization. While earlier flash mobs, such
as those conducted by Wasik or Improv Everywhere, were relatively disconnected form
the economy, it was not long before marketing organizations adapted the artistic
communications of the flash mob as an instrument to facilitate the communication of
money. Marketing, although itself not communicating money, and therefore not “part” of
the economy for Luhmann, is part of the environment of the economy. This can be
thought of, like Parsons (1956; 2007), as possibly a form of governance and therefore a
part of the political system. Like the state, corporations and marketing firms act to
construct a “could have always been otherwise,” and exert power over others by shaping
their actions in ways to increase their influence and ensure regular economic
communications−sometimes called the circulation of capital. This means that what we
have described as a marketing flash mob would, like the other systems described above,
attempt to borrow the complexity of the communications of art and its Anschauung to
draw attentions to specific products, companies, organizations, and artistic productions,
therefore ensuring the continuation of the circulation of capital.
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In each of the social systems being analyzed note that we see an increasing
number of interpenetrations and an increasing number of separate systems
communicating simultaneously and borrowing on each other’s complexity. In this way,
the interpenetration of the systems of art and mass media are not necessarily separable
from the system of art’s interpenetration with the political or economic system. This does
not mean that all social systems must be present in all communications; each system only
communicates within interpenetrations that are useful for their continuation through their
own internal processes. Nonetheless, our analysis of various systems communicating
through flash mobs illustrates both that the interactions between social systems can be
traced to a fair amount of complexity by analyzing how various systems can be seen as
affecting a specific communication, while simultaneously speaking to complex
interaction of various social systems within that communication and why any
identification of communication as belonging to only a specific system destroys the
complex realities of the interaction between systems.
In this section we have charted how various social systems, described by
Luhmann, can be seen within the flash mob communications analyzed in the first section
of this dissertation. In doing so, we glimpsed the complexity of the interactions between
these systems by understanding their interpenetrations in the communications of flash
mobs. We now turn to describing the influence of social systems on flash mobs that were
neither described directly by Luhmann nor are readily identifiable as composing the
social structural landscape normally discussed by sociology.
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Flash Mobs Communicating as Vaguer Social Systems
Flash mobs sometimes appear to communicate content that is more difficult to directly
connect to an identified social system. This should come as no surprise since, for
Luhmann, social systems can range in size from “society”−the totality of all
communications−to a system of just two people. The most thoroughly analyzed small
scale social systems, or “interaction systems,” by Luhmann are systems of romantic love.
In Love as Passion Luhmann (1998) explores how, to compensate for the increasing
differentiation of people in modernity, forms of romantic love construct a miniature
social system between two individuals where “one must be receptive in principle to
everything about another person, must refrain from displaying indifference towards what
the other finds of great personal relevance” (p.13). The system differentiates itself from
the external world because “the person needs the difference between a close world and a
distant, impersonal one…between only personally valid experiences, assessments and
reactions and the anonymous, universally accepted world in order to be shielded from
immense complexities and contingencies” (p. 16).
Romantic love is only one example of small scale social systems for Luhmann
(1990), who more generally identifies that “interaction systems with face-to-face
interactions…are simple social systems” (p. 193). Such systems can even reach a fairly
high level of complexity and, although “only with great effort”, such “interaction systems
can consolidate enduring subsystems internally” (p. 193). That “sometimes by speaking
in whispers or simply standing or sitting next to someone one likes” (p. 193) our daily
face-to-face interactions can internally differentiate.
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Such examples point to an interpretive difficulty when we attempt, as we have
here, to map the interpenetrations in systemic influences of any given communication.
This is because the social systems surrounding us are labyrinthine. There are uncountable
social systems cutting across, what most sociologist would call, levels of analysis. 32 This
means there are more social systems, including less identifiable social systems, effecting
any given communication. This can also be seen in many of the flash mobs we have
described as “charitable” flash mobs. Many of these flash mobs, such as cash mobs for
local business or public awareness flash mobs (i.e. for cancer or mental health), are likely
to be effected by smaller social systems, by interpersonal relationships. Potentially more
interesting, though, we can describe at least one charitable flash mob that has formed
self-replicating communication. Orly Wahba’s Life Vest Inside utilizes its Anschauung to
raise the money necessary for the organization to host future flash mobs. In this way, Life
Vest Inside communicates to construct, for itself, future communications. As with
relationships and other smaller social systems described by Luhmann, the selfreferentiality of Life Vest Inside is likely fragile and unlikely to persist indefinitely.
Nonetheless, for the time being it appears to function as its own social system.
Flash Mobs and the Systems Theory of Agency
Having discussed the ways in which we can see social systems, as identified by Luhmann
as communicating via flash mob, we can now discuss identifying the influence of human
psychic systems. For this analysis, it may be useful to return to the flash mob we began
32

Technically, for Luhmann, regardless of whether we are talking about a romantic relationship or the

economy we are talking about the same level of analysis, the level of the social system.
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our analysis with, the individual and project responsible for the flash mobs genesis,
Wasik and his MOB project. In contrast to the above analysis of various social systems
intersecting communications within flash mobs, an analysis somewhat void of
individuals, Bob Wasik’s statements appear very personal. If we remember back to the
first chapter, Wasik began flash mobs because he was “bored” with a
novel−technologically induced boredom. Wasik sought to use the internet, not only to
assuage his boredom, but also to speak back at the very technological devices that
constructed this boredom. Wasik sought to display the “buzz” and the pointlessness of
what was presented via the internet, using the internet for this very communication33.
Throughout his various iterations of the MOB Project, Wasik describes how the structure
of internet communication displays itself in his work as his flash mobs become
increasingly viral until finally, the change characterizing all mass media: the audience’s
attentions diverts to something “new.”
If we are left trying to interpret Wasik’s communication in the same manner as
the theory of agency discussed in chapter two, we are left with a contradiction. This is
because Wasik, in his own descriptions of the MOB Project claims to be simultaneously
communicating as himself, that is to represent his own consciousness, and as the system,
in this case the mass media. Wasik describes himself as the mastermind in control of his
artistic expressions while also being dependent on the mass media, and creating a project
that, in every way, follows the whims of mass media communication. While this can be
33

The internet here is being considered a form of mass media. In this way saying the “internet is structuring

Wasik’s communication” is comparable to claiming that the social system of the mass media is structuring
his communications.
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seen simply as Wasik trying to communicate systemically in an ironic fashion, it
nonetheless constructs a problem in terms of analyzing his communications as system. If
we utilize the understanding of the structure/agency paradigm that grows out of the
theories discussed in chapter two we have to assume our possible answer will be: 1)
Wasik is expressing system, 2) he is expressing his own consciousness or 3) he is
expressing his own consciousness and the system in a diluted fashion, where his portion
of the communication conflicts with system’s portion. Of course, depending upon the
theory, the answer can take different forms. For example, if we utilize Giddens’
structuration framework, we may 1) try to understand the degree to which Wasik’s
actions are conscious actions reflecting his own agency; 2) recognize the degree to which
they are unconscious replications of structure; or 3) try to identify what are the
unintended consequences of Wasik’s actions that may become social structure in the
future.34 Or, if we were to utilize Archer’s understanding of agency, we may try to
understand the degree to which Wasik’s self-descriptions of his actions displays that he is
thinking through reflexive consciousness, and thus acting in an agented manner. Either
way, our analysis would inevitably conclude with the social scientist calling into question
some of Wasik’s self-descriptions while trying to carefully navigate an assumed duality
between social structure and human agency−a duality which negates the possibility of
both existing simultaneously.

34

The difficulty of executing such an analysis is that Wasik is claiming to consciously communicate

structure. For him to display the structural outcomes of communications by communicating systemically
would be exceptionally difficult within Giddens’ understanding of human agency.
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If we take a system theoretical perspective of agency, this opposition can be
avoided. The answer to the question of “whether Wasik is communicating system or his
own consciousness?”- is yes. This is because, for Wasik or anyone else to communicate
their consciousness, they have to communicate systemically, even if this is as simple as
communicating within language. Consciousness is not communications; our private
consciousness is not structured in a manner to communicate. So, if Wasik is to
communicate at all, he has to interpenetrate and borrow the complexity of social systems,
systems of communication. In this moment the system not only affects his utterance and
actions, his e-mails and his organizing, but he opens himself to the system which, in
structuring his communications, enters his system of consciousness, guides his
experiences while communicating and, even if only in microscopic amounts, alters his
consciousness. But, likewise, in using his own independent yet dependent, opened yet
closed, system of consciousness as the content of the communication he places into the
system, like an in cogito, his own structuring and, just like the social system in which the
communication occurs, alters the system he interpenetrated with, if only in the slightest
degree.
If we take our initial discussion of Wasik and the analysis of the interpenetration
of social systems, what we see is Wasik, while interacting with the systems surrounding
him to construct the MOB project, acts much like the other social systems described
above. While trying to purposefully communicate his boredom and dissatisfaction, he
borrows the complexity of various social systems to execute this communication. He
borrows the Anschauung of art, the constantly moving background reality of the mass
media, ect. We see Wasik acting as a system among systems. This inevitably is the
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system theoretical answer to questions of agency. To understand our interaction with the
social systems surrounding ourselves and the relationships between agents and society,
rather than appealing to essentialistic differences between systems and the individual, we
appeal to their similarity. Human beings are systems among a multiplicity of systems,
and our interactions are, therefore, fundamentally similar rather than different.35
Conclusion
In this chapter we have seen that, for systems theory, both the system communicating to
itself through the flash mob and the human being acting on the basis of their own
consciousness is only a contradiction if we view human beings as “within society.” If

35

If we combine this discussion with our history of flash mobs, we also see that human beings

communicating their consciousness as individual systems does not mean that the content of their
consciousness is the same. For instance, there is no need to assume that Staci Lawrence and Conroe Brooks
from Flash Mob America are not communicating their consciousness when they utilize various systems for
personal profit. Also, with the semi autonomy of psychic confluence, there is no reason to claim that, even
if such actions are structured by “systemic” ways of thinking, i.e. market logics, that they are not a part of
the independent systemic structure of the individual since, in replicating their own conscious experiences, if
interacting in mutual communication with social systems, the system effecting their consciousness, and
vice versa, does not destroy the autonomy of either. This points to the fact that, if discussed systemically
“structure” and “agency” are actually void of any specific moral character. One is not “good” and the other
“bad” and neither ensure a “better” or “worse” outcome. Both are only existent facts that neither contradict
no impede one another.
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both maintain their own independent closed systems, with mutual influences, rather than
making one subservient to the other, then the contradiction of structure and agency
dissolves. The above description of flash mob “communication” as dependent upon the
communication of the system and of flash mobs as an expression of human consciousness
can both be exhibited as an empirical truth. The flash mob does not have to be an
expression of either social structure or human agency, but can be both simultaneously
depending on whether we view the flash mob from the perspective of the social system or
the perspective of human consciousness. Both systems of communication and
consciousness filter out information. They are incapable of seeing outside of themselves.
The information that enters in from outside of the system is deemed allowable only
internally, only within the system. The systems of communication can only see the
expressions of human consciousness that match the communications that system
communicates. Such expressions provide the communication systems with
communications. If they are structured differently than the expressions of human
consciousness they are not a part of that system of communication. Likewise, human
consciousness only recognizes information similar to past experiences and actions.
Therefore, environmental information will not pass into the human being’s consciousness
unless it is correctly structured. At moments, human beings act in ways that are filtered
out by any or even every system of communication. At moments they act in ways that are
communicated within the system. All of these are expressions of human consciousness.
The expressions of consciousness that are systemic communications are not any less a
part of human consciousness. Structure and agency are not diametrically opposed forces.
They are not always in concert either. They have a transitory relationship sometimes
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acting in unison, other times not. The illustration of flash mobs provides observations that
make this relationship identifiable.
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CONCLUSION
The dissertation began with an imperative for theories of agency. If we cannot understand
how agency can occur within communications structured by social systems− rather than
as an exterior act, thought, communication, or action by individuals−then it is difficult to
claim agency has any place within modernity. Even if an “exterior agency” could be
identified in modernity, it must be admitted that agency rapidly declines as more and
more of our thoughts, words, and actions are being structured through rapidly expanding
social structures. If there is a potential for the concept of human agency, a theory of
agency must be constructed that is capable of aiding us to identify and execute our
potential influence over social systems, and it would have to understand agency as
occurring within the communications−within the actions of the system itself.
The need for this novel theory of human agency has lead this dissertation to
pursue a three goals: 1) utilizing systems theory to lay the foundations for a theory where
agency occurs within systems influence, 2) elucidating the interaction between
individuals and social structure in systems theory and 3) displaying this interaction
empirically. I will now conclude by providing a summary of the outcomes of this
dissertations execution of these objectives beginning by reiterating the clarification of the
individual in Luhmann’s systems theory, then by displaying how this clarification leads
to the beginnings of new theory of agency, and finally, by discussing the empirical
application of systems theory in this dissertation to flash mobs and its broader
implications.
An Elucidation of the Individual in Luhmann’s Systems Theory
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Systems theory, as it currently exist, does not possess a theory of agency. Rather, it
possesses an understanding of the interaction between individuals and social systems
lending itself well to a theory of agency. This relationship is not, as Moeller (2012) and
other anti-humanistic interpreters of Luhmann have claimed that systems theory, by
removing the individual from social structure, attempts a flat out dismissal of the
possibility of human agency, but one of mutual autonomy and influence. Luhmann’s
work defies our distinction of humanism and anti-humanism, not only because he
attempts to unify all of sociology under autopoietics (which would include humanistic
approaches in sociology), but also because Luhmann posits individuals being outside in a
manner that could be described as both “humanistic” and “anti-humanistic.” This is
because, rather than human individuals being outside the system and the system alone
having autonomy, the social systems exclusion of the individual autopoietically from
itself constructs a mutual autonomy, where both the individual (or more accurately the
psychic system since the biological organism of the individual is its own system) possess
a mutual autonomy. In this way, the psychic system’s own internal structure is the driving
force behind its own consciousness just as the social system is the driving force behind its
own communications.
Connected to this autonomy is also the fact that psychic systems are not
composed from communications, as social systems are, but are composed of
consciousness. This sets an even clearer contrast between individuals and social systems,
since they could not possibly be sub-systems of the same system. In fact, as explained
above, individuals have to interpenetrate with a social system to communicate their own
consciousness, thus borrowing the complexity of social systems is necessary for
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individuals if they are to try to share the content of “their own head” to other
individuals, who are likewise autonomous from them.
This merging of humanism and anti-humanism in the mutual autonomy of social
and psychic systems does not mean both are removed from each other’s influence. While
systems are “closed,” possessing autonomy over their own internal structure, they are
also “opened,” insofar as they must borrow upon other systems to self-perpetuate. The
economic social system is an example of this, where, as a result of being limited to
communication of money, it must interpenetrate with other social systems to ensure the
continued circulation of capital. Therefore, individuals and social systems, while
autonomous, must utilize one another. Social systems utilize individuals’ psyches, as well
as their bodies, to communicate. Conversely individuals utilize social systems to
overcome the boundaries of the psychic system and communicate with a world outside of
itself, an environment composed of psychic, social, and other systems. It is a result of this
need for interpenetration within systems theory that constructs its potentiality as a new
theory of agency.
Psychic Confluence: The Foundations for a Novel Theory of Agency
With the relationship between the individual and structure in systems theory specified, it
then becomes possible to posit Luhmann’s theory as providing a basis for a new theory of
agency and allows us to fulfill the next goal of the dissertation. Since systems theory
treats individuals’ consciousness as mirroring social structures in their form but not in
their content, individuals interact with social systems similarly to how social system
interact with one another. A social system can affect and borrow from other social
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systems without threatening their autopoietic autonomy; likewise, individuals can affect
and borrow from social systems. The automatically assumed antagonism between the
individual and social structure, which is constructed when the individual and the structure
are posited as causal agents, is reduced. There is no need to assume that individuals, in a
perfect conformist manner, share the same goals as social systems with which they
interact but, instead, individuals seek to communicate the contents of their own
consciousness. Such an analysis reduces the need to identify individuals’ behavior as
representing either their own agency, the social system, or a deluded combination of both.
Alternatively, it exhibits that individuals affect social systems while simultaneously being
effected by them in the same instance. To affect means to intertwine, to borrow, to cocommunicate, and therefore mutually influence one another−the theory of psychic
confluence.
If correct, this understanding of agency has the potential of constructing an
analysis that would have extreme significance for understanding how agency works in
modernity. With the proliferation of system, not only would this theory of agency have
significant implications for our ability to discuss agency as existing, but that such a
description of agency would hold greater analytic utility as we progress further into
modernity and as social systems compose a greater and greater portion of our
environment. By thinking within a systems theoretical lens we could comprehend
individual consciousness as a system which, through its own distinctions, attempts to
observe the outside environment. Our outside environment (already composed of a
variety of biological, ecological, and psychic systems with which we interact)
increasingly is composed of social systems larger both in number and size. As a result of
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this change in social systems, our environment becomes increasingly complex and
fragmented. More and more of our existence is spent in conversation with these systems.
Increasingly the communications we produce are interjected with the structuring of these
systems. So long as we do not learn to identify their existence and our interrelationship
with this expansive elements in our environment, then we categorically misunderstand
how we interact with our environment. This implies that our capacity to affect the world
outside of our own consciousness would be greatly diminished. In this way, how we
discuss agency, something not identified by critical realism or structuration, determines
the impact of agency.
By simply claiming agency as an attribute, as an innate part of human beings,
given to us a priori in the structures of our body or our consciousness, existing theories
assume agency is a quality unaffected by theorizing concerning agency. Instead, agency
is seen as seen as something to be asserted for normative reasons. It is the normative and
political implications of asserting agency, bending towards the progressive, that dances
behind its theorizing. That sociology must make a place for the individual to influence
society, otherwise, political action is superfluous.36

36

For Luhmann (1997), normative distinctions are themselves systemic distinctions. Norms are the self-

replication of the system. From this perspective, having a political or normative basis for the assertion of
human agency external to society is ironic. The assertion would, rather than constructing human agency,
itself be the latent replication of social structure. If human agency is something that comes from its
externality to the social system, then normative action would be the limiting of human agency.
Additionally, this points to one of the major difficulties in both Luhmann’s and Parsons’ systems theories
for sociology in the United States, which is intrinsically intertwined with normative distinction based on the
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I am not bringing up this aspect of existing theories of agency to attempt to say
human beings cannot affect politics. Despite the fact that all political action is de facto
systemic, politics structuring of its own communications does not negate the
environmental influences of the individual. Politics’ system-ness and individual agency is
not antithetical if we take into consideration psychic confluence.
Nonetheless, theories of agency, through this political and normative desire,
vehemently promote individuals standing antithetical to social structure because their
political commitment to agency is something antisystemic and humans possess an ability
to act with agency regardless of how our environment changes. I suggest agency is not
static like they describe. Instead, the influence we have over our environment is
contingent on how that environment adapts and as well as how we adapt and change to
that environment. Furthermore, our understanding of our own agency effects our ability
to influence that environment via our interpenetration with system. By possessing
consciousness, which systems do not possess, our capacity to affect our environment is
contingent on our ideas about the social environment surrounding us and on how we are
understanding our infinite and incomprehensible environment. This becomes a call to

assertion of specific values. For systems theory norms latently reproduce the existing social order. Norms
reinforce modern social structure. Thus, the assertion of normative values is always a conservative force
maintaining social order. To increase our capacity to influence the social world, it is more significant that
we learn to identify the society in all of its inherent complexities even if their existence is offensive to us.
Because of this, systems theory is often identified as conservative because it is outside of this normative
distinction when, for systems theory, the only potential of being anything but a force conserving existing
social structure is to be outside of this distinction.
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understand agency, not in ways to make us comfortable that are determined by our
normative and political codes, but in ways that build upon the recognition of the limits of
our agented potential through how we interact with our changing social environment.
Flash Mobs: Systems Theory Empirically Displayed
To fulfill the third goal I analyzed flash mobs. It began with an inventory of flash mobs
that attempted to display the breadth and width of flash mobs. It presented how−contrary
to much of the scholarly literature’s description of them−flash mobs are conducted with
the intention of communicating a plurality of content, so that to identify a specific
“meaning” for flash mobs is, at best, exceptionally difficult and imprecise, or at worst
more misleading then enlightening. Thus, rather than trying to identify the central
meaning or essence of the flash mob, I understood the flash mob as a type of
communication and attempted to identify the various systems possibly communicating
through a flash mob. This initiated an analysis capable of examining and understanding a
wide variety of content communicated through the flash mob. This dissertation gives an
account of social systems (art, mass media, politics, and economics) that utilize flash
mobs. It also identifies at least one example of a “small system” that can communicate
through flash mobs similar to macro-institutional social systems. While other examples of
systems could be identified, especially depending on the type of flash mob, this serves as
a glimpse into flash mobs illustrating a system theoretical approach.
In empirically analyzing flash mobs through systems theory, the dissertation also
demonstrates a potential hermeneutic that could move social scientists beyond some traps
within sociology which, at times, cause us to perform ad hoc reductions of societal
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phenomena. These reductions hem us in rather than broaden our understanding of the
complex world surrounding us. I acknowledge that at moments my analysis may appear
overly formalistic, an issue plaguing all systems theory. Critics could contest that the
entire analysis hinges on the existence of an “autopoietic form” dancing behind all social
and psychic systems. However, the dissertation’s intention is that even if identifying an
autopoietic form behind these systems is only an explanatory fiction, such a fiction would
nonetheless clarify the complexity of communications surrounding the flash mob, the
exemplar pursued in this dissertation. It is the concept of the autopoietic and the resulting
interactions that allow differences to persist and multiplicities to be identified and
analyzed in light of one another. If nothing else, utility exists in thinking of individuals
and social structures as systems. That, by utilizing this conceptual structure, the
dissertation unlocks a fluid world where every action can be thought of as a combination
or commingling of art and economics, media and politics, intimate relations and the
totality of society. Instead of possessing specific meanings, every action becomes a
multiplicity that, rather than leading us into a confusing mass, into the darkness of the
unknowable, instead opens and renders legible our social world. What has been attempted
here is one small step towards such an analysis.
This fluid world of communicative multiplicities not only opens our ability to
analyze the interaction of various social systems, but also between psychic and social
systems. Intermixed with these multiplicities are individual systems of psychic
consciousness that interject themselves into communications and structure it just as social
systems have. In fact, it could even be said that the distinction between structure and
agency itself is obfuscation. Agency and structure are the same form of influence enacted
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on a given communication. Individuals, themselves being systems, influence their agency
in an act of structure.
Despite psychic and social systems being the boundary of the empirical
descriptions in this dissertation, this is by no means the boundary of this form of analysis.
There is a potential for systems theory, not only to display the interaction between social
systems or between social systems a psychic systems, but also the interaction between
social and psychic systems and a plethora of other systems identified by Luhmann and
systems theory. To construct the theory of autopoietic social systems, Luhmann (1997;
2012; 2013) borrows on the works of biologists, psychologist, mathematicians, and
physical scientists, all of whom identify autopoietic systems in their subsequent fields.
Systems are not limited to our social world, nor are they sui generis to human beings and
their productions, but they occur in natural processes as well. As a result it is possible to
perceive that, just as we identified social and psychic systems interpentrating, systems
theory has the potential to display the interpenetrations of human psychic systems and the
biological systems of their bodies, of societal system and ecological systems, of computer
systems and epistemological systems. It could be utilized to describe many of the
interactions which have plagued not only theory but the whole of Western thought, as
well as interactions not even yet posited.
Maturana and Varela’s (1920) Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the
Living originated the term autopoiesis for biology prior to Luhmann’s later application of
the term to sociology. Here Maturana and Varela utilize autopoiesis as a proposition for a
biological theory of what it means to be alive. They claim that what gives something the
quality of being alive is its ability to self-reproduce based upon its own internal structure.
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And so, by applying the term to social systems, Luhmann seems to be claiming that
social systems are alive in the same sense that a biological organism is alive. In analyzing
the interaction between social and psychic systems I have, in essence, been describing the
interlinkage between multiple living entities. In this way, it is not a stretch that there is
interpenetration, interconnection, between any living entity with another living entity−be
they a cybernetic computer, cockroach, salt-water estuary, economy, or psyche− and that
they could be analyzed in the same way the relationship between, say, the political and
the economic system is analyzed.
While it would have been impossible to bring all this to fruition within a single
research project, let alone a doctoral dissertation, I have attempted to make small steps in
this direction by displaying the interaction of a multiplicity of social and psychic systems
as they are present in a single set of communications: the flash mob. But the possibilities
are endless. Not only could similar analyses be performed on any communication present
within society, undoubtedly interlaid with the influence of a plethora of other systems,
but by tracing out interpenetrations the interaction of a world composed of the incredible
variety of systems could be understood.
In addition to the extending the analysis performed in this dissertation into the
interplay of a variety systems, the current study also raises questions open to further
study. As identified in the Chapter 3, the full complexity of Luhmann’s systems theory, is
not applied, but only the concepts of autopoietics and interpenetration are utilized to
reevaluate the theory of agency. Extending our analysis to evaluate the impact of
system’s theory overall framework on agency would be beneficial. For instance, the
variety of social systems identified in this study are themselves embedded within a large
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social system, society. Likewise, they are composed of sub-systems which possess
autopoietics. Social structures exist, such as religion, which we would intuitively assume
are systemic but that Luhmann identifies as not being systems. Although psychic systems
would be external to and interpenetrating with all of these complexities imbued into
systems theory−since, as we have seen above, Luhmann identifies them as external and
interpenetrating−how this mutual influence occurs is left as an open question even if we
have displayed how it occurs in the plethora of social systems with which we interact on
a day to day basis. Further research into the interpenetration of psychic and social
systems would benefit from a thorough exploration of how society, subsystems, and nonsystemic structures influence our interaction with social systems.
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